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With the recently directed closure of Fort Ord, the
Monterey Peninsula will be left with only two relatively small
military establishments: the Naval Postgraduate School and the
Defense Language Institute. The Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS), located within the city limits of Monterey, has
essentially provided its own base operations support since its
inception. The Defense Language Institute (DLI), also located
in Monterey, is not a stand alone organization. DLI has been
a tenant command of Fort Ord since its arrival at the Presidio
of Monterey in 1946. Thus, it has relied upon Fort Ord for
essentially all of its base operations support requirements.
The upcoming closure of Fort Ord requires that a new plan be
laid out in order for DLI to continue operating at the
Presidio of Monterey.
Base Operations Support (BOS) includes numerous functions
required for an organization to operate; such as,
supply/logistics, facility support, security, safety, fire
protection, morale/recreation/welfare (MWR) programs,
contracting, and numerous administrative duties.
There are several means by which base operations support
could be provided to DLI, including:
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"* Continued support from within the Department of the Army;
"* Contractual support with private sector entities under a
BOS contract;
"* Support agreements with local government; and
"* Consolidation with the Naval Postgraduate School.
Because of economic and logistical factors, the base
closure and realignment process has directed that the
Department of Defense retain a portion of Fort Ord (referred
to as the "Presidio of Monterey (POM) Annex"). By retaining
the POM Annex, the Army can also retain a scaled down version
of the support organization presently located at Fort Ord.
This reduced organization can meet the future support
requirements of DLI and the annex itself.
Another means in which this support could be provided is
through Base Operations Support (BOS) contracts with the local
economy. This, however, is not necessarily a comprehensive
approach to complete base operations support. BOS contracts
traditionally do not cover all functions found under base
operations support. Furthermore, the success of BOS contracts
at bases within the United States is questionable.
In addition, it may also be possible to turn to the local
government for negotiated support agreements. However, use of
local governmental support may be limited by laws and
regulations and is not included in the scope of this study.
Another alternative calls for the consolidating support
functions with the Naval Postgraduate School. Given the
2
preexisting and self-sufficient NPS organization in
combination with the relatively small size of the remaining
Army establishment, it is quite feasible to expand the NPS'
base operations support organizations to provide support for
both DLI and the POM Annex.
In all practicality, it is not likely that any single
option would be the most effective support plan for DLI.
Instead, a combination of these options may be more
appropriate for comprehensive base operations support. A
complete consolidation with the Navy or complete turnover to
the private sector could be problematic. For instance, the
Navy would be hampered by Army specific requirements,
regulations, control systems, management information systems,
procedures, instructions, and cultural norms that are not
easily superimposed upon another service.
In light of the present fiscally constrained operating
environment, it is important to discover the most cost
effective means of doing business. Furthermore, since the
enactment of the Base Closure and Realignment Act, many
organizations have discovered that continued existence is
virtually contingent upon efficient operations.' Although
1 Public Law 101-510, November 5, 1990, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Act. This act requires the review of military
bases for possible closure or realignment in an attempt to reduce
defense expenditures. One of several factors used by the
individual services and the BRAC Committee in identifying bases for
closure or realignment is the local operating costs.
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DLI successfully remained off of the base closure and
realignment lists of 1991 and 1993, it will likely go under
further scrutiny in 1995, during the final round of review
required by the law. Therefore, implementing a fiscally wise
support plan for DLI can not be overemphasized.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis will focus on one component of base operations
support, the facility support function. Facility support is
a critical part of a comprehensive plan to provide continued
base operations support to DLI once Fort Ord is closed. In
terms of cost, facility support is typically one of the most
significant components of base operations support. Therefore,
this limited study captures a significant portion of the total
picture.
As briefly discussed above, there are several options
available for providing support to DLI and the POM Annex.
However, this study will incorporate only the two most likely
options for facility support:
"* Consolidating support operations under an expanded Naval
Postgraduate School Public Works Department; and
"* Maintaining an independent Department of Engineering and
Housing.
These two options were chosen because they are the primary
alternatives being pursued by DLI officials since Fort Ord's
closure was announced. These options are the two most logical
4
means of accomplishing continued facility support for DLI and
the POM Annex, given the limited experience and
restrictiveness of the other options. Furthermore, the Base
Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Committee has recommended that
the Army consolidate with NPS for local facility support. 2
Because there are economies of scale associated with
facility support operations, consolidating local Army facility
support with NPS's Public Works Department appears to be
economically beneficial. We will investigate whether using a
single organization to provide all facility support for the
military establishments remaining on the Monterey Peninsula
would be more efficient than multiple independent
organizations.
The main objective of this thesis is to compare the costs
of these two facility support options for DLI and the POM
Annex. Further objectives include substantiating that
economies of scale exist with empirical data, analyzing the
costs and benefits for the consolidation option, and
determining the overall impacts on facility support costs for
NPS if consolidation is executed.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question of this thesis is: "can
facility support functions for the Defense Language Institute
2 The Monterey County Herald, 72nd yr., No.11, June 25, 1993,
pg. A14.
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(DLI) and the POM Annex be performed more economically by
expanding the Naval Postgraduate School Public Works
Department?" Additional issues to be addressed include:
"* Existence of economies of scale;
"* Organizational structures to meet changes in workload;
"* Benefits/disadvantages to consolidation; and
"* Impact on facility support costs for NPS and DLI.
D. SCOPE
In order to discover the most efficient means of providing
facility support to the POM and the POM Annex, this study will
compare the costs associated with the two options identified
above: consolidating all facility support requirements with
NPS or using a separate Army facility support organization.
The costs will be developed based on the organizational
requirements associated with each option as determined by the
NPS Public Works Department and the Department of the Army
(published in the United States Army Force Integration Support
Activity (USAFISA) study of 1991).
For such a cost comparison to be valid, the two options
must yield the same end product. In order to ensure the same
end product, the specific facility support functions included
in this study are limited. Differences in organizational
structure and accounting records as well as the unavailability
of certain data require us to limit the facility support
functions to the following: maintenance of real property,
6
minor constructicn, utilities operation and maintenance,
engineering and planning services, hazardous waste, and
contracting for maintenance services.
In developing the cost comparison, our primary focus is
on the resulting labor costs of each option. Currently, labor
costs comprise nearly fifty percent of the total cost of the
above listed facility support functions for both NPS and Fort
Ord/DLI. Material, utility, and contract costs together make
up the remainder. Therefore, a reduction in labor costs plays
a major role in the overall cost effectiveness.
Because the use of facility support contracts is
essentially a substitute for organizational labor, they are
also of concern in this study. However, to the extent that
the number and scope of these contracts are the same, we
assume that their resulting costs (direct and indirect) will
be the same for either organization. 3  The costs of these
contracts are considered to be differential only when they are
used to a different extent by the Army or the Navy. 4
In focusing on only the labor costs associated with both
organizations, we assume that the material and public utility
3 For example, the number and scope of the facility support
contracts for DLI (janitorial, refuse collection, and grounds
maintenance) will be the same regardless of whether the Army or
Navy organization is used.
4 Only in the case of family housing support is the use of
facility support contracts significantly different. The proposed
Army organization relies on contract labor to a much greater extent
than the NPS organization, as will be identified later in the
thesis.
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costs would be the same for the Army or the Navy. Since these
costs are more a function of location rather than
organization, their exclusion from this study is reasonable. 5
Because this is an analysis of facility support costs, the
facilities to be supported must be identified. Several
significant changes in the size and content of the remaining
POM Annex have been proposed while this study was performed.
The most recent change came from the Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) Committee's recommendations. For the purposes
of this study, the POM Annex is defined to be consistent with
the BRAC Committee recommendations.
Under their recommendations, the POM Annex is limited to
the Post Exchange (PX), the Commissary, one Child Care Center,
and whatever the number of housing units deemed necessary by
the remaining local military installations. 6  Discussions
with the NPS Public Works Officer revealed that approximately
1,203 housing units to be retained.
The manpower requirements of an expanded NPS public works
organization or a separate and autonomous Army facility
support organization are both based on providing support to
DLI (located on the POM) and the POM Annex (as defined above).
Furthermore, the scope of support is to remain on a status quo
5 One might argue, however, that the amount of material (thus
material costs) is a function of the organization used. This point
is brought out later in the thesis.
6 The Monterey County Herald, 72nd yr., No. 11, June 25, 1993
pg AI,A14.
8
level. No additions or subtractions to the overall support
currently being provided to DLI are assumed. Although each
organization will operate under their own standard procedures,
the overall tasks to be performed under either option are
assumed to be equivalent.
E. LIMITATIONS
Various obstacles were encountered that limit this study.
These limiting factors are discussed in the following
subsections.
1. Accounting Systems and Organizational Structures
Differences in Army and Navy accounting systems
preclude directly comparing like products without converting
data or rearranging categories into similar structures. It
was necessary to determine which facility maintenance function
was included in which code of the Army system. Fort Ord does
not have a reimbursable system for off-station facility
support services (such as performing maintenance at DLI) nor
a working system for separating these costs from on-station
costs (such as performing maintenance at Ft. Ord). The lack
of this type of accounting prevented a detailed review of
historical cost data.
Organizational structures also varied greatly, further
limiting the detail of the analysis. The Navy facility
support organizational structure is essentially self contained
within one department, Public Works; the Army's is not. Under
9
the Army system, three department level organizations perform
facility support type services: Logistics (DOL), Contracting
(DOC), and Engineering and Housing (DEH).
2. Estimated Organizational Requirements
The Army organizational data used in this analysis was
based upon the requirements published in the 1992 USAFISA
study. While the Army estimates were validated by the USAFISA
study team as accurate, they were based on the originally
proposed POM Annex. This annex was substantially larger than
the area recommended by the BRAC commission in 1993.
The Army has not since revised their organizational
requirements to reflect this change in the POM Annex. To
arrive at a new "estimate" that is consistent with the scope
of facilities to be supported, we had to modify the Army
facility support organization. Although we believe our
approach in modifying the organizational requirements to be
objective and accurate, it is only an estimate.
3. Level of Service
Actual levels of service for facility maintenance are
not necessarily the same between the Army and Navy facility
support organizations. Unfortunately, there was no
maintenance data (backlog maintenance, annual inspection
surveys, maintenance hours worked) to illuminate the
methodology and procedures normally used by the DEH. The
Deputy DEH director was uncooperative in accessing this
10
historical data despite repeated attempts to gather such
information.
However, from the information available, it appears
that the NPS Public Works Department generally provides a
greater level of service as compared to their DEH
counterparts. For example, the Navy organization seems to
place much more emphasis on preventative maintenance than the
Army organization.
Differences in the level of service have impacts on
other associated facility support costs. As the Navy
emphasizes preventative maintenance, its labor costs are
inherently higher because of the additional personnel required
to operate in this manner. However, this strategy can have an
impact on other costs, such as reducing material and contract
costs. Also, it can bring other intangible factors into the
comparison, such as customer service and satisfaction.
Because of the difficulty in defining the differences
in the level of service and quantifying their impact in the
analysis, it is only noted that differences exist. Any
impacts on cost or end product differentiation are not
factored into the cost comparison.
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F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BOS: Base Operations Support
BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure
DEH: Department of Engineering and Housing (Army)
DLI: Defense Language Institute
DOD: Department of Defense
DRM: Department of Resource Management
FORSCOM: Forces Command (Army)
ISSA: Interservice Support Agreement
MWR: Morale Welfare and Recreation
NPS: Naval Postgraduate School
POM: Presidio of Monterey
PWD: Public Works Department (Navy)
PX: Post Exchange, (Army)
TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command (Army)
USAFISA: United States Army Force Integration Support
Activity
G. PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS
A brief description of the remaining chapters is provided
below.
Chapter II provides background information regarding the
Fort Ord-Defense Language Institute Base Operations Support
relationship, funding process, ISSA, and the BRAC process and
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its impacts to the military installations on the Monterey
Peninsula. It also provides an overview of the Army and Navy
facility support organizations. Chapter III discusses the
methodology used in the data collection and analysis process.
It identifies the procedures used in obtaining the necessary
data and for making any estimates required to perform the cost
analysis. Chapter IV presents the data collected and the
illustrates the required estimations. Chapter V analyzes the




A. FORT ORD, DLI, NPS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Fort Ord
Fort Ord was established on the Monterey Peninsula in
1919. Located approximately 5 miles from Monterey, between
the cities of Seaside and Marina, it was the home of the
United States Army's Seventh Infantry Regiment (Light) until
its recent decommissioning. As a part of the Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) process, Fort Ord will be closed except for
a relatively small portion to be renamed the Presidio of
Monterey (POM) Annex.
Organizationally, Fort Ord falls within the Army's
Forces Command (FORSCOM) from whom it receives the majority of
its funding for both mission and base operations support. In
1992, Fort Ord maintained and operated a total of 18.1 million
square feet of training, office, berthing, and other facility
spaces on 28,500 acres of land.
2. The Defense Language Institute
The Defense language Institute opened in 1941 at Fort
Snelling, Minnesota and relocated to its present location at
the Presidio of Monterey (POM) in 1946. DLI currently
provides instruction in 21 languages for all services and has
an average yearly enrollment of 3,600 students.
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Organizationally DLI falls within the Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and receives its mission funding
from this source. However, the POM itself is owned by
FORSCOM. The POM area encompasses approximately 390 acres of
land with approximately 1.7 million square feet of office,
training, and housing space.
3. The Naval Postgraduate School
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has operated on
the Monterey peninsula since 1951, when it was relocated from
the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. NPS provides
graduate level instruction in various engineering, science,
and management curriculums for approximately 1500 students
from all U.S. services and numerous foreign military services.
NPS's major claimant is the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO). NPS receives its direct funding from this source. In
addition to its direct funding, NPS also receives a
significant amount of indirect funding (reimbursable). The
majority of these funds are derived from research work;
however, a portion is from tenant command reimbursement.
NPS provides its own base operations support from the
various departments within its command structure. As of 1993,
no support agreements exist between the Naval Postgraduate
School and the Defense Language Institute or Fort Ord, with
the exception of housing for some NPS military students and
staff at Fort Ord.
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B. BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
Fort Ord is presently tasked by the Department of the Army
with providing Base Operational Support (BOS) for all Army
facilities in the "local" area. These other installations
include the Defense Language Institute (DLI) located at the
Presidio of Monterey (POM), Fort Hunter Liggett (FHL) located
approximately 100 miles south east of the Monterey Peninsula,
and, to a limited degree, various Army Reserve sites in
California and neighboring states.
However, this study will concentrate only on the Defense
Language Institute and Fort Ord. Support for the other
commands (FHL and reserve areas) is to be transferred from Fort
Ord to Fort Lewis, commencing FY 1994. Thus, their support
requirements will no longer be an issue.
BOS is provided by numerous departments centralized on the
Fort Ord Post. These departments include the Directorate of
Engineering and Housing (DEH), Directorate of Contracting
(DOC), the Directorate of Logistics (DOL), Directorate of
Resource Management (DRM), Finance and Accounting Office
(FAO), and the Directorate of Personnel And Community Affairs
(DPCA).
C. BOS FUNDING CHANNELS
Because Fort Ord is tasked with supporting other
installations, it is accordingly funded to do so. Until the
closure of Fort Ord, FORSCOM provided Fort Ord with BOS
16
funding for supporting itself, Fort Hunter Liggett, and DLI.
Even though DLI operates under a different claimant, TRADOC,
it still received BOS on a non-reimbursable basis. Figure 2.1








(Directorae of Rource Ma-geme R Ord)
BOS Funding Channel
Figvre 2.1
D. FORT ORD & DLI ISSA
Fort Ord and DLI have negotiated an Interservice Support
Agreement (ISSA) for the Base Operations Support functions
provided by Ft Ord to DLI. 7  BOS, as defined in the ISSA,
includes numerous items, from finance and accounting support
7 Inter-Service Support Agreement No. W62R65-274, between
Commander, 7th Infantry Division Light/Fort Ord and Commandant,
Defense Language Institute, 28 Nov. 1990.
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to petroleum oil and lubricants. In terms of cost, one of the
major functional areas of the ISSA is the maintenance and
operation of DLI's facilities and grounds, or those functions
that would be performed by a Public Works Department at a
Naval installation.
An important point concerning the ISSA between these two
commands is that Ft Ord has the discretion to make decisions
affecting the level of support provided to DLI. Specifically,
Fort Ord is required to provide, on a non-reimbursable basis,
only that level of support it provides to itself. Therefore,
the level of support provided from year to year could vary
depending on the level of funding available or on the
priorities of the Fort Ord Commanding General. As a result,
one of the major complaints voiced by the Defense Language
Institute is that it has very little control over what
facility support it receives. Further, because of the
differences in facilities, requirements, and priorities that
are predominant between training commands and operational
commands, DLI does not necessarily get the full support they
would like. 8
Facilities personnel at DLI have therefore suggested
altering the existing arrangement to a reimbursable agreement.
Instead of receiving non-reimbursable support from Fort Ord,
the Department of the Army would provide BOS funding directly
8 Meeting with DLI Facility Manager, Mr. Jerry Abeda, 21 July
1993.
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to TRADOC which in turn would fund DLI. It was thought that
controlling their own dollars would inherently give them more
control over what support they received. Nevertheless,
attempts to implement this change were not successful. 9
E. BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT (BRAC)
1. BRAC Summary
Because of the changing world threat situation and
ever tightening federal budget constraints, the military's
force structure is being reduced. Common sense dictates that
any significant reduction in force structure would necessitate
corresponding infrastructure reductions. Accordingly, the
Defense Base Closure And Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIX
of Public Law 101-510) was enacted to establish new procedures
for closing or realigning military installations in the United
States.
The act established an independent Defense Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission to review and amend
the Secretary of Defense's base closure recommendations in
accordance with published selection criteria. This commission
is charged with reviewing the Secretary's base closure and
realignment recommendations for three subsequent calendar
years: 1991, 1993, and 1995.
9 Meeting DLI Facility Manager, Mr. Jerry Abeda, 21 July
1993.
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Upon receipt of the Secretary's list (no later than
April 15 of the respective year), the BRAC Commission reviews
the recommendations and conducts public hearings. The
Commission then must report their findings, conclusions, and
recommendations to the President by July 1.
The President is to approve or disapprove the
Commission's recommendations and forward them to Congress by
July 15. If approved by the President, Congress then has 45
days to accept or reject the commission's recommendations, in
their entirety. If not approved by the President, the
Commission may revise the list in whole or in part. Revised
recommendations must be approved by the President and
transmitted to Congress by August 15 of the year concerned.
If approval is not attained and transmitted to Congress prior
to 1 September, the process for that year is terminated.
2. BRAC Impacts on Fort Ord and DLI
a. Fort Ord
In April 1991, at the conclusion of the first round
of the base closure review cycle, Fort Ord had been designated
for closure. As the BRAC process proceeded, Fort Ord remained
on the closure list and was ultimately approved for closure.
As a part of this decision, the Seventh Infantry Regiment,
(Light) was to be relocated to Fort Lewis, Washington (but
subsequently has been decommissioned).
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A significant issue that arose from the decision to
close Fort Ord concerned how to meet support requirements for
the Defense Language Institute operating at the Presidio of
Monterey (POM). Because of the limited housing available at
the POM, Fort Ord provided additional family housing. Also,
DLI relied upon the Post Exchange, Commissary, various MWR
activities, and numerous DEH and DOL facilities that were all
located on Fort Ord. Therefore, the BRAC commission decided
to retain a portion of Fort Ord to support DLI. The remaining
portion of Fort Ord was designated as the POM Annex.
The POM Annex was also justified by the fact that
Fort Ord provides support to various services and personnel
beyond those currently attached to Fort Ord, the Seventh
Infantry, or DLI. For example, the Post Exchange (PX) and
Commissary facilities also support Navy and Coast Guard
personnel stationed in the area as well as numerous military
retirees.
Additionally, the Fort Ord Housing provides family
housing services for 200-300 Navy and Coast Guard personnel.
This demand will continue after Fort Ord's closure. Housing
functions themselves provide an operational savings to the
government of up to $500 per unit per month, compared to the
21
average rents of housing off station. 1 0  This significant
savings makes their continuation highly desirable.
Several proposals were brought forward regarding
the POM Annex area necessary to support DLI, the Coast Guard,
NPS, and others after FY 1995. Initial plans retained
approximately 2100 acres and 1.8 million square feet of office
and work space along with 1400 housing units and various
Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) assets.
In November and December of 1992, survey teams
from the U.S. Army Force Integration Support Activity
(USAFISA) and the Office of the Chief of Engineers validated
the support requirements for this proposed annex. The USAFISA
team also derived the manning organization necessary to
support the Defense Language Institute and the Presidio of
Monterey Annex after Fort Ord's closure (including a caretaker
force to maintain excess areas and facilities until properly
disposed of). Several variations or options were included in
this study because the actual annex size had not been
finalized. Depending on which of the various options was
chosen, the report concluded that between 25 to 40 million
dollars would be required to provide Base Operations Support
to the annex and DLI.
10 Based on the Navy's estimates of NPS's La Mesa Housing
which are quite similar in all respects to Fort Ord's family
housing.
22
b. The Defense Language Institute
The Defense Language Institute was impacted by the
second round of the base closure process in early 1993. The
Secretary of Defense recommended closing the POM and
relocating DLI. However, as the BRAC process proceeded, the
Commission reversed this position and recommended that DLI
operate at the Presidio of Monterey. Fundamental to this
decision was the requirement to reduce overhead costs
associated with the operation of DLI at the POM. 1 1
In order to reduce overhead costs, the Commission
recommended reducing the size and content of the POM Annex
(formerly Fort Ord). These recommendations were as follows:
"* Retain only enough military housing required to support
area DOD installations (NPS, Coast Guard, and DLI);
* The POM Annex should include only housing, one child care
center, the Commissary and Post Exchange; and
"* Fort Ord Golf Courses should be disposed of.
These recommendations, recently approved by the
President and Congress, significantly change the level of base
operations support required for DLI and the POM Annex. In
addition to these recommendations, the Commission also
recommended that DLI's facility maintenance functions be
11 The Monterey County Herald, 72nd yr., No. 11, June 25,
1993, pg Al, A14.
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performed by the Navy.12 Although this thesis began well
before the BRAC commission reviewed the DLI issues and made
any decisions concerning them, their recommendation for
consolidation gave further impetus for this study.
F. FACILITY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS
As stated before, this study is concerned with only the
facility support component of base operations support (BOS).
Both the Army and the Navy have internal organizations that
provide this service to meet their individual needs.
Naval installations perform all of their facility support
functions under a single organization, Public Works. NPS has
its own internal Public Works Department which is responsible
for facility support. On the other hand, the Army performs
facility support functions under a variety of Departments.
The following subsections provide a more indepth description
of the Army and Navy organizations.
1. Army Organizational Structure
The Army provides facility support through various
Directorates within its organization. While the majority of
facility maintenance functions are performed by the
Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH), the Directorate
of Logistics (DOL) and Directorate of Contracting (DOC) also
12 Whether or not this recommendation is binding upon the Army
is subject to disagreement. To date no direction has been given
nor any progress made in implementing this recommendation.
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provide services in this functional area. Figure 2.2
illustrates the Army's facility support organization.
Currently, all of these organizations are centralized on Fort
Ord with the exception of small on-site offices/facilities.
DEH
1 & j{ringI F4 eriow & Maintance Housing
DOC :DM
_D~ucdor FDkiiec~tor
I Deut" Drecr D y Diect
AManteanc SupatW Tiansportation
(Unted States Army Force Intergranion Agency Snidy, BRAC 1991)
Army Facility Support Organization
Figure 2.2
In preparing for the post-closure period, the Army has
proposed a modified organization to meet the reduced support
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requirements. 1 3  The modified facility support organization
maintains essentially the same structure but its elements are
significantly reduced in size.
A brief description and breakdown of each department
is provided in the subsections below.
a. Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH)
As stated earlier, DEH is the 'entral body
responsible for an installation's facility maintenance and
operations. The proposed DEH organization is composed of
several branches as described below.
(1) Office of the Director. This office plans,
directs, supervises, and coordinates all facility engineering
activities for Fort Ord, the Presidio of Monterey (DLI), and
Fort Hunter Liggett (FHL). This office is equivalent to the
Navy's Public Works Officer and his/her immediate assistants.
(2) Administrative Section. This section's
function is to coordinate and direct DEH's administrative
tasks of DEH. Its tasks are primarily comprised of general
office services, such as correspondence, filing, report
generation and submission. It additionally provides
departmental mail service, processes travel requests, and
records maintenance.
13 The proposed Army BOS organization for the post-BRAC period
is published in the 1991 USAFISA report.
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(3) Engineer Resource Management Division. This
division is comprised of 5 internal branches: Budget, Work
Management, Management Engineering Systems, Energy Management,
and the Self Help Store.
The Budget branch is responsible for the
planning programming, budgeting, and executing accounts within
the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) and Army Fam.ily
Housing (AFH) appropriations.
The Work Management branch operates the service
call desk and is responsible for reviewing, evaluating, and
estimating all facilities engineering work requests. They
prioritize and coordinate work requests, schedule cyclical
inspections to identify facility maintenance work
requirements, and maintain facility records.
The Management Engineering Systems branch is
responsible for operating and maintaining computer systems and
computer applications for the DEH staff. This branch also
performs industrial engineering studies.
The Energy Management branch negotiates,
prepares, and administers utility purchases and sales
contracts. It also maintains liaison with state and municipal
bodies regarding utilities and operates energy monitoring and
control systems.
The Self Help Store branch operates the
self-help program for family housing, troop billet residents
and the civilian work force. It receives, reviews, and
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approves requests for material support for self-help projects.
Upon approval, it also provides the materials for troop
support projects of less than $1000. Additionally, this
branch includes the Furnishings Management Office which is
responsible for the inventory control and assignment of
furnishings and appliances for family housing and troop billet
residents.
(4) Engineer Division. This division is broken
down into three branches: Design, Contracts, and Services.
The Design and Contracts branches provide engineer and
contract execution support for Fort Ord, DLI and FHL,
including full design and execution of engineering projects to
repair and upgrade installation facilities. The Services
branch is responsible for overseeing all service contracts
performed on the installation.
(5) Plans Division. This division is comprised of
three branches; Master Plans, Real Property, and Environmental
Branch. Responsibilities of this division include master
planning functions (long range facility planning), property
record maintenance, and environmental compliance activities
for all area Army installations.
(6) Housing Division. This division's mission is
to centrally manage all housing requirements. Its tasking
includes budgeting, administration, management, and operation
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of the installation's housing facilities. This division also
had two personnel assigned to barracks management.
(7) Operations and Maintenance Division. This
division's responsibility is to plan, organize and execute
repair, operations, maintenance, and construction work on
improved and unimproved real property facilities. The
Operations and Maintenance Division is composed of 3 main
branches to include the Repair branch, the Utilities branch,
and the Supply branch.
b. Directorate of Logistics (DOL)
This department performs traditional supply and
support functions, many of which are similar to the Navy's
Supply Department. However, under its Maintenance Division,
DOL also provides for an element of facility support. The
maintenance and repair of vehicles (the motor pool) is part of
the transportation function of facility support and in the
Navy organization is fulfilled by public works.
c. Directorate of Contracting
This department is responsible for providing
contract administration actions for procuring supplies,
services, construction, maintenance, repair, and utilities.
It also performs commercial activity cost comparison studies,
convenes source selection boards, and coordinates objectives
related to federal procurement programs. DOL is divided into
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four branches; Administrative Support, Purchasing,
Contracting, and Contract Administration. DOL provides
contracting services for many functions and a portion of their
work is attributable to facility maintenance functions.
2. Navy Organizational Structure
Facility maintenance at the Naval Post Graduate School
is accomplished by its Public Works Department. Although the
Public Works Department must interact with the Supply
Department for purchasing actions and the Comptroller shop for
budget concerns, it is essentially autonomous in performing
the facility maintenance function. An organizational chart
for the NPS Public Works Department is illustrated in Figure
2.3 below.
NPS Public Works Organization
FOC w- -- - -- - -. pw
IcomR~cr om•
TRANSPORTATIN
trmnm (Afl PUAhc Work Depammem)
NPS Public Works Department
Figure 2.3
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The NPS public works department is comprised of 7 separate
divisions, each of which contribute to facility maintenance
and operations. These divisions include: Administration,
Budgeting, Engineering, Facility Support Contracting, Housing,
Maintenance Control, and the Shops (the actual laborers). A
brief description of the components of the public works
organization is provided in following subsections.
a. Administration
The Administration Division provides general
administrative support to the Public Works Officer and
Assistant Public Works Officer as well as other division
directors and staff as required. It coordinates the
completion and submission of the numerous internal and
external departmental reporting requirements, maintains the
departmental files, and prepares departmental correspondence.
b. Budgeting
The Budgeting Division provides the fiscal support
required by the Department. It maintains internal accounting
records for departmental spending, coordinates and submits the
Department's annual budget requirements to the Comptroller
Department, and liaisons with the Supply and Comptroller
Departments concerning fiscal matters.
c. Engineering
This division provides design and engineering
support for the installation. Specifically, it performs
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special project design and review, prepares military
construction (MILCON) requests and justifications, prepares
contract specifications, maintains facility plans and
drawings, and performs long range planning. The Engineering
division is also responsible for providing professional input
and advise to support maintenance, repair, and construction
projects.
d. Housing
The Housing Division administers and operates the
installation's Family Housing facilities. Specific tasks
include: quarters assignment and termination, coordination of
maintenance and repairs, budgeting and fiscal matters,
inspection of housing contract performance, and the completion
of various reporting requirements.
e. Maintenance Control
The Maintenance Control Division (MCD) prepares
work orders for station maintenance, repair, and small
construction or alteration type projects. It operates the
trouble desk to which facility problems are called. MCD also
coordinates, schedules, and prioritizes work orders for Shop
personnel. Additionally, this division coordinates the
station's Annual Inspection Summary (AIS) which identifies the
condition of all facilities and grounds for reporting
requirements to the Major Claimant as well as for generating
a maintenance backlog list.
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f. Shops
This division includes a combination of
maintenance, utility, and transportation personnel who operate
and perform routine maintenance/repairs for all facilities,
utility systems, and transportation equipment. In essence,
these are the individuals who perform the actual facility
maintenance and operations (the direct labor personnel).
While combined into a single division at NPS, these three
functional areas are typically separated into individual
divisions at larger installations.
g. Facility Support Contracting
The Facility Support Contracting (FSC) division
performs the contracting actions necessary to provide facility
service contracts to NPS. Current NPS service contracts cover
such tasks as janitorial services, grounds maintenance, and
refuse collection. This division writes, advertises, awards
and administers all Public Works service contracts with
technical assistance from MCD, Engineering, and sometimes the
ROICC office.
h. Other Support Activities
Other activities also support the Public Works
Department. The Resident Officer In Charge of Construction
(ROICC), a tenant activity at NPS, provides construction
contract support to NPS. Although a tenant activity, the NPS
Public Works Officer serves as the ROICC (dual hatted).
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Nevertheless, the daily operation of this office is delegated
to his deputy within the ROICC office. The PWO-ROICC
"dual-hating" is intended to ensure goal congruence between
the station and its tenant ROICC office.
One last organization which also provides support
to the NPS PWD is the Naval Facilities Engineering Field
Division, Western Division , (WESTDIV), located in San Bruno,
CA. This a-civity, when requested, assists in miscellaneous
projects and engineering studies to support the Public Works




In this chapter we will discuss the data collected and the
methodology used to analyze the data. The data can be broken
down into three main areas, as listed below.
"* Army/Navy FY 92 facility support costs;
"* The USAFISA validated facility support organization
proposed by the Army to provide continued facility support
to DLI and the POM Annex as defined by the 1991 BRAC
proposal; and
"* The Navy's facility support organization as proposed by
the NPS PWD to fulfill the facility support requirements
of DLI and the POM Annex as defined under the recent 1993
BRAC proposal.
The historical cost data (FY 92) for each of the concerned
installations provide a base line to illustrate the relative
cost difference between using a single, large organization to
support several bases (Fort Ord's facility support
organization) and using a relatively small, independent
organization to support a small base (NPS Public Works
Department). Assuming there are returns to scale, using a
large organization to support several installations will be
cheaper than using small independent organizations at each
installation.
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The two proposed facility support organizations provide
the fundamental data for forecasting and comparing their cost
effectiveness in supporting the DLI/POM Annex. Prior to
comparing the two proposed organizations, the Army's USAFISA
validated organization will be revised to reflect the decrease
in size and content of the POM Annex under BRAC 1993. Then
the resulting differential costs of the two organizations will
be estimated and compared to identify which proposal is more
cost efficient.
In comparing either the historical costs or estimated
future costs of facility support under the two organizations,
the product received from each organization must be equivalent
to make the cost comparisons meaningful. In developing the
cost comparison, we attempt to look through the accounting
systems and organizational structures to ensure equitable
comparison of the associated costs.
Additionally, we note that the scope of work to be
performed for DLI/POM Annex is the same under each
organization. However, this does not account for the
differences in quality, reliability, and timeliness of the
work performed. Both the Army and the Navy have their own
way of operating; their individual standards, strategies, and
norms. Quantifying these factors would require an indepth
analysis of Army/Navy facility life cycle cost data to
determine which organization's procedures are more cost
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effective. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this
thesis and thus we only identify the issue.
B. HISTORICAL COSTS
In order to appreciate the relative costs of facility
support under the Army and Navy organizations as they
currently exist, the historical costs of both services were
analyzed. Fiscal year 1992 data was utilized because it
provided the most recent cost data covering an entire year.
Thus, it reflects relatively current operational efficiency.
As stated in Chapter I, this study assumes that material,
public utility, and certain service contract costs are non-
differential costs. Thus, the only costs of concern for
analyzing cost effectiveness are labor and differential
service contract costs. However, the FY 1992 data obtained
from Fort Ord did not separate labor, contract, material, and
utility costs. Therefore the historical data presented in
this study for both the Army and the Navy represents the total
cost of facility support.
1. Army Historical Data
As stated previously, Fort Ord has provided facility
support to Defense Language Institute (DLI) and Fort Hunter
Liggett (FHL), in addition to servicing its own needs. The
facility support services are provided as a part of the total
Base Operations Support (BOS) for these three Army commands.
To understand how facility maintenance costs are distributed
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within the Army accounting system, the list of BOS activity
codes was reviewed.
BOS Activity codes are listed in Table 3.1 by type of
activity. These codes are further broken down into sub-codes.
For example, Utility Operations, code J, includes sub-codes
JO-J6 and JA-JH. Each sub code identifies a more specific
activity functional area. 1 4 By reviewing the description of
each code and sub-code, the BOS activity codes which involve
the facility support functions were identified.
Of the 22 BOS functions, seven contain elements
identified with facility support. Those facility support
codes are Army Family Housing, Maintenance of Non-Tactical
Equipment, Operation of Utilities, Maintenance and Repair of
Real Property, Minor Construction, Engineering Support, and
Contract Operations (shaded in Table 3.1). Only five of these
activity codes, however, are exclusively facility maintenance
functions; the remaining two include only a small percentage
of facility maintenance tasks. The two areas with only
limited facility maintenance functions are Maintenance of
Non-Tactical equipment (B) and Contracting (W).
Data from the two non-homogeneous areas could not be
separated into facility maintenance and non-maintenance costs.
Therefore, only those activity areas which are totally devoted
to facility maintenance tasks are included in this study.
14 AR 37-100-93, Financial Administration, ARMY MANAGEMENT
STRUCTURE (AMS), 1 July 1992.
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TABLE 3.1




B Installation Supply Operations
C Maintemance of Non-Tactical Equipment
D Transportation Services
E Laundry and Dry Cleaning
F Army Food Service Programs
G Personnel Support
H Unaccompanied Personnel Housing
J Op>eration of Utilities
K Maintenance and Repair of Real
________property
L • inor Cnnstruction
x Engineering Support




S Community and Morale Support
Activities
T Preservation of Order
U Resource Management Operations
V Plans and Training
w Contract Operations
Y Records Management
(Source: Directorate of Resource Management, DLI
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The two services deleted from this study, the
maintenance of vehicles/equipment and contract administration,
will not impact any conclusions of this thesis.
In the case of the Non-Tactical Equipment Maintenance,
the associated Navy vehicular costs were also deleted.
Similarly, the Navy's ROICC office costs, which are equivalent
to the Army's Contract Operations, were also deleted.
Furthermore, both of these functions are relatively small
compared to the other facility support functions. This
mitigates any possible impacts to the overall analysis.
The Army facility support cost for a given fiscal year
will be calculated by summing the remaining facility
maintenance code elements. Once the historical costs are
compiled, they will be used for making cost comparisons based
on organizational size. The costs of Army facility support
will be reviewed at both the overall Army level (Fort Ord,
DLI, FHL) and for DLI separately using the cost data obtained
from Fort Ord and DLI.
2. Navy Historical Data
The Navy's historical facility support costs were
obtained directly from specific Sub-Activity-Group (SAG) codes
from prior year budgets. The SAG codes which comprise
facility support funding are shown in Table 3.2.
All portions of each SAG are dedicated to facility
support functions. Therefore, no transformation is required.
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However, SAG FD, Engineering support, includes the school's
fire department. This is not a facility support function
provided under the Army organization. Therefore, it is not
included in our scope. The costs associated with the fire
department were removed prior to performing any cost
comparisons.
TABLE 3.2
NAVY FACILITY SUPPORT ACCOUNTING CODES
SAG Description







-- Navy Family Housing
(Source: NPS Comptroller)
The historical cost comparison only considers Navy SAG
codes FA, FB, FC, FD (as edited), and Navy Family Housing.
These categories directly correspond with the facility support
functions included in the Army cost figures.
3. Cost Comparison Methods
In order to compare the historical cost of facility
support at the relevant military installations, a unit costing
measure will be used. Because there are separate
Congressional Appropriations for family housing and base
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operations, these two will be analyzed separately. The unit
cost base used for family housing is number of housing units
while the unit cost base for installation facilities is square
feet of facility space. These allocation bases provide the
average cost associated with operating and maintaining the
respective facilities.
Using these historical unit costs, the facility
support costs of the various installations can be compared.
All other factors being equal, we expect that the cost per
square foot and cost per housing unit for the Army will be
substantially lower than for the Navy given the vast
difference in organizational size and area of responsibility.
This expectation is consistent with returns to scale in
facility support organization.
However, all other factors are not equal and this will
affect the costs of providing facility support. The type of
facilities on the installations, the age of the facilities,
and their condition are all factors that impact facility
support costs. These factors must be considered when making
any cost comparisons.
Moreover, the level of service provided by the
individual facility support organizations has a significant
impact on labor costs. As the level of service increases,
more labor hours are required. Data was collected to
determine the level of facility maintenance support routinely
provided by each service. Interviews with knowledgeable Army
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and Navy personnel provided several insights which indicate
differences in service levels. These differences must be
considered when performing cost comparisons.
a. Navy Level of Support
Discussions were held with the NPS Public Works
Officer and Shops Division Director to determine the level of
services provided at the Naval Postgraduate School. In
general, the Navy performs a range of facility support tasks
for shore activities through both in-house and contractor
provided services. The main thrust of the Navy program is
developing long and short range plans for completing
maintenance and repair services. These plans include
preventative maintenance programs through standing job orders.
The Navy believes that preventive maintenance and pre-
breakdown maintenance/repair significantly reduces long term
facility maintenance costs.
The Maintenance Control Division (MCD) is at the
forefront of this process. MCD performs an Annual Inspection
Summary (AIS) which categorizes each area of the base by cost
account code. It identifies and prioritizes the required
maintenance and repairs. MCD also performs routine planning
and estimating functions for the maintenance, repair, and
preventative maintenance tasks.
Facility Support Contracting plans and schedules
services performed by commercial activities. Service
43
contracts are used for tasks that are more economically
provided through private sources. Current NPS service
contracts include janitorial service, refuse collection, and
grounds maintenance contracts. NPS also contracts with
Pacific Gas and Electric for high voltage electrical and gas
line maintenance on the main distribution lines for these
utilities. This is accomplished through a usage based utility
surcharge.
In the janitorial contract, NPS contracts for full
services, meaning it does not use military or Navy civilian
employees to perform this function in any office spaces,
classrooms, or common areas within the barracks. The refuse
collection and grounds maintenance contracts are also
essentially full service contracts but are augmented to a
degree by shops division personnel.
In summary, NPS attempts to provide facility
support services with emphasis on preventative and pre-
breakdown maintenance and repairs. These services are
provided using both in-house personnel and commercial
activities.
b. Army Level of Support
Fort Ord DEH personnel were initially contacted to
determine what functions and level of support were provided by
the Army organization. Unfortunately, it was not possible to
conduct any interviews with either the DEH Office of the
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Director or other divisions as requested. Therefore,
discussions were held with the DLI Facilities Manager. This
individual is responsible for coordinating Fort Ord
maintenance support at DLI. Therefore he is qualified to
provide information on this topic.
According to the DLI Facilities Manager, self-help
plays a large role in the Army maintenance program. Generally
speaking, the Army provides supplies and tools for occupants
to perform routine maintenance and upkeep. As an example,
barracks' rooms are painted by the occupant before
transferring out. Barracks personnel also perform most
janitorial services in both private rooms and common areas
within the barracks. In family housing, residents often
perform routine maintenance functions ranging anywhere from
replacing a washer in a leaking faucet to repairing or
replacing toilets. Military personnel are also tasked with
grounds maintenance duties. Military and civilian employees
perform a portion of the janitorial duties in offices and
classrooms.
Performing these duties using military and civilian
employees (non facility support personnel), reduces the labor
costs associated with facility support.
Maintenance performed by DEH Operations and
Maintenance division personnel is normally on a breakdown
basis. Generally, service is not provided for routine
maintenance activities unless the facility or equipment is no
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longer functioning. Essentially only ongoing/reoccurring
tasks such as water treatment are accomplished on a regular
basis.
Preventative maintenance is not performed on a
regular basis. A lack of preventative maintenance is
documented in the USAFISA study. This study attributed the
high back log of maintenance work requests to the lack of a
good preventative maintenance program.
Funding cuts over recent years are partly
responsible for the relatively low level of facility
maintenance service. The funding reductions have required the
Garrison Commander to decide what receives highest priority,
mission/training or facility support. 1 5
C. DETERMINING ORGANIZATIONAL COSTS
The following sections discuss the methodology used to
estimate organizational costs of both the Army's and the
Navy's proposals. Both proposals are designed to provide
essentially the same tasks and level of service. Regardless
of which proposal is used, it is assumed that the same
material and public utility costs will be incurred.
Therefore, the only differential costs are those associated
with each organization's labor requirements and use of service
15 Meeting with Mr. Jack Gafford, Directorate of Resource
Management, Ft Ord, 18 August 1993.
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contracts. Only these differential costs are of concern in
comparing the proposals' cost effectiveness.
1. Service Contract Costs
The number and scope of service contracts to be used
by both organizations are essentially the same for
installation support. They basically consist of janitorial,
refuse collection, and grounds maintenance. The costs of
these contracts are geographic location dependent and would
vary little regardless of whether the Army or the Navy
employed them. Therefore, the costs of installation service
contracts are not considered differential costs and were
omitted from this study.
On the other hand, housing service contracts are used
to a significantly different degree under the two
organizational proposals. The Army organization is designed
to rely on contract labor to provide much of the housing
maintenance while the Navy organization is designed to use
very little contract labor. Therefore, the costs of housing
service contracts are considered differential costs and must
be accounted for in this cost comparison.
In order to account for the differences in housing
service contract costs, we will estimate the contract cost
associated with each organization based on the actual FY 1992
housing contract costs.
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2. Army Organizational Labor Costs
The Army, in planning for support required by the
Presidio of Monterey (POM), DLI, and other facilities
remaining after Fort Ord closes in 1995, requested the U.S.
Army Force Integration Support Activity (USAFISA) to complete
a study. This study was based on the requirements for
providing BOS services to DLI and remaining organizations
located upon Fort Ord (the POM Annex) on a status quo basis.
Generally speaking, most departments providing BOS services
would remain after the post's closure; however, on a smaller
scale. Between 30-50 percent of pre-closure BOS personnel
would remain depending on which of several options was chosen.
The organizational structure and direct labor manhour
requirements validated by the USAFISA survey team served as a
starting point for estimating the cost of the Army
organization. However, the POM Annex was reduced
significantly in size and content under the 1993 BRAC review.
Thus, this baseline needed to be reduced to reflect the
reduced area of responsibility. The Army has not published a
revised manpower proposal and so the required modifications
could only be forecasted. The following technique was used to
forecast the organization's likely size.
a. Army Direct Labor & Direct Labor Supervision
Historical records will be used to determine actual
direct manhours exhausted for facility support at DLI and the
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annex portions of Fort Ord as defined by BRAC 1991. This
historical data is found in the USAFISA study. The direct
manhour requirements for the newly defined annex are adjusted
in proportion to the reduction in facility square footage.
The total number of direct labor employees will be based on
the revised labor hour requirements.
Direct labor supervision for the new baseline will
be calculated using the direct labor to supervision ratio
identified by the USAFISA team. For example, if the USAFISA
study indicates that one supervisor is necessary for every 6
direct labor personnel the same 6 to 1 ratio is assumed for
the new organization. Similarly, the upper level supervisor
requirements will be forecasted by the lower level supervisors
to higher level supervisors ratio indicated in the USAFISA
study.
b. Army Indirect/Overhead Labor
Indirect and overhead manpower requirements were
reduced in proportion to the reduction in facility area.
However, there are certain fixed components that cannot be
reduced within a relevant range of output (facility support).
Positions in the original USAFISA approved organization which
are fixed will be identified. Only the variable positions
will be reduced. In determining which positions are fixed,
the following criteria will be used:
49
* The division directors and one administrative assistant
per director are fixed. These positions remain constant
regardless of the downsized POM Annex;
* Within the Engineering Division, one engineer is required
for each of the four basic disciplines (general, civil,
mechanical, electrical). Each of these disciplines are
required because of the specific technical expertise
required; and
* Within the Engineering Resource Management Division, the
Work Management Branch requires one planner/estimator
versed in each specific discipline (mechanical,
structural, electrical). Again, this is due to the
specific expertise required in each area.
The total organizational requirements will be
estimated by adding the fixed positions to the revised number
of variable positions. Then salaries will be assigned to the
various positions to estimate the overall organization labor
cost. Because salary assignment data was not available from
the Army's Civilian Personnel Office, a means to estimate the
salaries was required. This study uses the average salary of
the current DEH organization. This provides cost data that
reflects the relative salary structure of an Army facility
support organization.
3. Navy Organizational Labor Cost
The NPS Public Works Department developed several
proposals for providing facility support to DLI/POM Annex.
Each proposal was initiated because of the changing
requirements dictated by the current dynamic environment. The
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final proposal (to date) was based on the 1993 BRAC
recommendations regarding the content and size of the POM
Annex. Therefore, it did not require any modification. This
final proposal also was designed under the premise that the
tasks and level of service currently being performed at
DLI/POM Annex would be provided by the Navy.
The basic proposal listed the additional manpower
requirements necessary to support the Army installations. The
overall labor cost will be determined by assigning salaries
associated with each of the organization's positions and
compiling them.
As before, an average salary will be used. However,
average salaries per division or branch will be used for the
Navy organization instead of an organization-wide average.
Because there will be a significant portion of the
organizational labor costs allocated between the Army and the
Navy, it is important to ensure that the cost data reflects
the salary differences of the various positions more
accurately.
To allocate the labor costs between the Army and the
Navy, the organization was reviewed to determine the division
of labor between NPS and DLI/POM Annex. The Public Works
Officer indicated that NPS used a supplemental approach were
possible in determining the additional manpower/skill
positions required for the DLI/POM Annex. A supplemental
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approach enabled the Navy to capture any possible economies of
scale resulting from the increased organizational size.
For example, DLI requires an elevator mechanic.
However, an additional mechanic was not included because the
tasking could be met by the NPS elevator mechanic. Also,
DLI/POM Annex has a requirement for an electrical engineer,
mechanical engineer, and civil engineer. However, only two
additional engineers are added because the technical specialty
requirements can be met with NPS's existing engineering staff.
With the supplemental approach, various employees are
"shared" by the two installations. This creates a cost
accounting problem; how much of each shared person's salary is
attributable to each installation? It is easy to trace
individuals who are a direct coqt (work only at/for the Army
or the Navy). However, tracing individuals who constitute a
common cost (perform work for both DLI and NPS) presents a
difficulty.
It is not feasible for us to forecast the amount of
time each "shared" individual will spend performing work for
each of the installations. Therefore, an allocation method
will be used to estimate actual costs attributable to each of
the respective installations. Adding the direct and the
allocated costs associated for each installation will yield
the total labor costs attributable to the Army and the Navy
under the Navy's proposal.
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4. Comparison of Costs
Once the labor cost estimates for both the Army's
proposed organization and the Navy's proposed organization are
determined, they will be compared in Chapter V. The labor
costs will be added to the estimated housing service contract
costs to arrive at a total differential for each organization.
The resulting costs of each organization will be summarized
and the variances analyzed. Additional discussion and
analysis will be performed to determine possible
recommendations for action and further study.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION
A. HISTORICAL FACILITY SUPPORT COSTS
This section presents the historical costs for fiscal year
1992 for both the Army (Fort Ord) and the Navy (NPS). The
total overall costs of facility support (labor, material,
utilities, and service contracts) will be used to determine
the cost per square foot of base/post facility space and the
cost per housing unit.
1. Army Historical Data
Base operations support (BOS) services for the Army at
Fort Ord, DLI, and Fort Hunter Liggett totaled over $90
million in FY 92. Of this total, over $45 million was
obligated for facility support and family housing services.
A detailed breakdown of BOS service costs is shown in figure
4.1.
The cost of facility support is determined by adding
only those categories that are related to facility support.
As discussed in Chapter III, Contract Administration (W) and
Transportation Equipment Maintenance (C) are not included
because many non-facility support functions are within these
categories. Maintenance of Real Property (MRP) and Minor
Construction were not available separately, but are combined
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under one account. The related facility support costs are
summarized in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.1
ARMY FY 1992 BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT COSTS
Code Activity Cost($K)
B Supply 4,735.7
C Maint Non-Tactical Equip 6,029.3
D Transportation 4,436.8
E Laundry 853.0
F Food Service 6,350.5
G Personnel Support 4,190.6
H Bachelor Housing 740.9
J Utilities 11,986.0
K/L MRP/Minor Construction 7,149.6
M Other Engineering Support 8,361.7
N HQ Garrison Support 2,809.7
P ADP 1,705.1
Q Reserves 199.2
S Community Support 2,619.0
T Preservation of Order 4,525.7
U Rescue Management 3,577.3
W Contracting 1,517.8
Y Records Management 1,072.7
19X0 Army Family Housing 18,504.0
Total 91,364.5
(Source: Directorate of Resource Management, Fort Ord)
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TABLE 4.2
ARMY FY 1992 FACILITY SUPPORT COSTS
Code Activity Cost ($k)
J Utilities 11,986.0
K/L MRP/Minor Construction 7,149.6
M Other Engineering Support 8,361.7
SubTotal 27,497.3
19X0 Army Family Housing 18,504.0
Total 46,001.3= 1
(Source: TABLE 4.1)
Determining the cost per square foot of installation
facility support and the cost per unit for housing operations
and maintenance requires data on the square feet of
installation facilities and number of housing units in the
area of responsibility. This information is shown in Table
4.3.
TABLE 4.3
ARMY FACILITY SUPPORT AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
Installation Facilities 11.3 msf
Army Family Housing 5943 units
(Source: DRM, Fort Ord)
Dividing facility support costs by total square
footage yields cost per square foot. The cost per housing
unit was similarly calculated. Unit costs for each are shown
in Table 4.4. The unit costs shown in Table 4.4 represent the
average total facility support costs for all the locations
serviced by Fort Ord.
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TABLE 4.4
ARMY OVERALL FY 1992 UNIT COSTS
Installation Support $2.43 per sq ft per year
Army Family Housing $3,114 per unit per year
2. Defense Language Institute
Costs for all BOS services, including facility support
functions, are reported annually to DLI by Fort Ord. These
reported costs were reviewed to determine how Fort Ord costs
were allocated to DLI. DLI officials were not aware of the
allocation method used in reporting these costs. The facility
support cost data Fort Ord reported to DLI in FY 92 and the
facility square footage/housing unit data is used to determine
the unit costs. This information is provided in Tables 4.5
and 4.6.
TABLE 4.5
FY 1992 DLI FACILITY SUPPORT COST DATA
Code Activity Cost ($K)
J Utilities 1797.9
K MRP 1037.3
L Minor Construction 35.1
M Other Engineering Support 1238.0
Sub Total 4108.3
19X0 Army Family Housing 274.2
Total 4382.5




Installation Facilities 1.7 msf
Army Family Housing 93 units
(Source: DRM, Ft. Ord)
As above, the unit cost per square foot and per
housing unit are calculated to arrive at the average cost of
facility support and housing operation and maintenance at DLI.
The results are shown in Table 4.7.
TABLE 4.7
FY 1992 DLI UNIT COSTS
Inst.llation Support I $2.42 per sq ft per yea-
Army Family Housing 1 $2,948 per unit per year
Considering the similarity between the costs in Tables
4.7 and 4.4, it appears that Fort Ord allocates its facility
support costs by square footage frr installation support and
number of housing units for housing operation and maintenance.
3. Navy Historical Costs
NPS' facility support costs were obtained in the same
manner used for the Army installations. Facility support
related SAG's and their respective costs for PY 92 were
obtained from the NPS Comptroller division and are presented




FY 1992 NPS FACILITY SUPPORT COSTS
SAG Activity Cost ($K)
FA MRP 5,056
FB Minor Construction 165
FC Utilities 1,541
FT Hazardous Waste 187
FD Engineering Support 1,935
Sub Total 8,884





Facility Spaces 1.4 msf
Navy Family Housing 877 units(NPS Public Works Department)
As with the Army, the unit facility support costs are
calculated to obtain NPS's average cost per square foot of
installation facilities and per housing unit. The resulting
unit costs are summarized in Table 4.10.
TABLE 4.10
FY 1992 NPS UNIT COSTS
Installation Maintenance $6.35 per sq ft per year
Navy Family Housing $4,180 per unit per year
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This completes the FY 1992 average facility support
costs for both the local Army and Navy installations. The
estimated costs of the proposed Army and Navy organizations
will be calculated in the following two sections.
B. ARMY ESTIMATED COSTS
As the next step, costs were estimated for an Army
organization to provide facility support to DLI and the POM
Annex after Fort Ord closes. The scope of support is limited
to the area defined in the recent 1993 BRAC report. As
discussed previously, the only Army organizational data
available was based on the 1991 BRAC intentions. Therefore,
the organizational requirements are to be reduced in
accordance with the methods described in Chapter III. Once
the original organization is modified, the associated facility
support costs are estimated. The following sections present
the data, forecasted modifications, and resulting estimated
costs as broken down by the organizational components.
1. Operations and Maintenance Division
The original validated organization's Operations and
Maintenance Division includes 61 positions, as presented in
Table 4.10. These divisions are organized under three
branches: the Repairs Branch, the Utilities Branch, and the
POM Branch. These positions are mostly direct labor, but
there are some overhead/supervisory positions.
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TABLE 4.10
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE DIVISION
Division Chief 1
Secretary 1
Repair Branch Utility Branch PCX Branch
Branch Chief 1 Branch Chief 1 Branch Chief 1
Mechanical 1 Boiler Shop 1 Secretary 1
Foreman Foreman
Maintenance 6 Boiler Operator 1 Foreman 1
Mech/Plumber
A/C Mechanic 3 Pipefitter 1 Boiler Mech 2
Struct. Rpr. 1 Welder 1 Electrician 1
Foreman
Maintenance 1 Sheetmetal 2 Pipefitter 1
Mechanic
Glazier 1 Utilities 1 Equipment 1
Foreman Operator
Locksmith 1 Maint. Mech 3 A/C Mech 1
Carpenter 2 Water Plant 1 Maint Mech 4
Operator
Painter 1 Sewage Plant 1 Warehouse 1
Operator Laborer
Civil Works _Electrical 1 Subtotall
Foreman Foreman _
Equip. Operator 5 Electricians 2
Pest Control 1 High Voltage 3
Foreman Tech





The designated fixed positions are the division
director, two secretaries (one each at DLI and the POM Annex),
and one warehouse worker located at the POM. These positions
are shaded in the table. The director and secretarial
positions perform top level supervision and provide the
division's general administrative requirements. Two
secretarial positions are designated fixed because support
operations are conducted at two separate locations.
Similarly, the warehouse worker is fixed because this position
provides the minimum on-site supply support required for the
separate facilities. Table 4.11 summarizes the fixed and
variable positions.
TABLE 4.11
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE DIVISION
FIXED AND VARIABLE LABOR SUMMARY
Fixed 4
Variable (Direct Labor) 47
Variable (Supervisor 1) 7
Variable (Supervisor ii) 3
Total 61
(Source: TABLE 4.12)
The Operations and Maintenance Division contains all
of the direct labor positions (i.e., the plumbers, carpenters,
welders, etc.). The number of these positions is directly
related to the amount and type of facilities supported. On
the other hand, the variable supervisory positions in the
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Operations and Maintenance Division are directly related to
the number of direct labor employees. Thus, these two
categories of personnel are inter-dependent and the
relationship between supervisors and direct labor needs to be
determined.
A relationship between workers and supervisors can be
inferred from the original organization validated by the
USAFISA study. It is assumed that these ratios are fairly
constant across various organization sizes because they
reflect the span of control which supervisors can effectively
manage. The ratio of direct labor employees to level one
supervisors and the ratio of level one supervisors to level




Type Number Sup(II) :Sup(I) Sup(!) :Labor
Ratio Ratio
Supervisor II 3
Supervisor I 7 1 : 1.75 1 : 6.71
Direct Labor 47 1 _ _
(USAFISA Report)
Assuming that this ratio remains fairly constant for
all levels of direct labor staffing, an organization would
require approximately one level one supervisor for every 7
direct labor employees and 1 level two supervisor for every 2
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level one supervisors. These ratios are applied in the
modification of the Army organization.
The next step is to determine the change in the actual
facilities of the POM/POM Annex. The 1991 BRAC results
indicated that 3.3 million square feet of installation
facilities and 1400 housing units would remain. The 1993 BRAC
process reduced these amounts to 1.9 million square feet of
installation facilities and 1203 housing units.
The modified organization decreases the direct,
supervisory, and support personnel required to maintain the
reduced area. However, the manpower requirements cannot be
reduced by the corresponding percent reduction in square
footage. There are fixed positions and other relationships
that don't depend on facility size. The Operation and
Maintenance Division also provides some support to housing.
The effort spent on housing must be allocated on a housing
unit basis.
In order to approximate the number of personnel
required by the new 1993 BRAC baseline, direct manhour
requirements are estimated. The USAFISA report estimated the
direct manhours required to support the facilities in the 1991
version of the POM and POM Annex. The direct manhour
requirements are separated into three portions; DLI, Family
Housing, and the POM Annex. Table 4.13 summarizes this data.
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TABLE 4.13
1991 USAFISA Validated Manhour Requirements
Area Facilities Manhours
POM 1.7 msf 26,590
POM Annex 1.8 msf 25,335
Army Family Housing 1400 Units 22,780
Total 74,705
(USAFISA Report)
The direct manhour estimates can be modified to
reflect the reduced area requirements. The manhour
requirements are assumed to be proportional to the square
footage of installation facilities and the number of housing
units.
The direct labor manhour requirement for housing is
calculated as follows:
1203 unitsx 22,780hours = 19,575hours
1400 units
The 1993 BRAC process did not affect the size or
content of DLI (POM). Accordingly, the direct labor manhour
estimates provided in the USAFISA report will remain as
published. On the other hand, the 1993 BRAC report
drastically reduces the POM Annex. Essentially, all Fort Ord
closes except for one child care center, the Commissary, and
the Post Exchange facilities. The approximate square footage
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of installation facilities shrinks to less than 200,000. The
direct labor manhour requirement for the POM Annex is reduced
correspondingly :
0.2msf x 25,335hours = 2,815hours
1. 8msf
Total direct labor hours required for the new 1993
BRAC baseline are shown in Table 4.14. Converting to the new
baseline reduces manhour requirements from 74,705 hours to
48,980 hours (a 35 percent reduction).
TABLE 4.14
NEW 1993 BRAC BASELINE MANHOUR REQUIREMENTS
Area Facilities Manhours
I
POM 1.7 msf 26,590
POM Annex 1.8 msf 2,815
Army Family Housing 1400 Units 19,575
Total 48,980
The estimated manhours and corresponding number of
employees published in the USAFISA report indicates the
effective manhours per year for the Army organization. The
effective manhours per employee as calculated from the USAFISA
report is shown in Table 4.15.
TABLE 4.15
EFFECTIVE MANHOURS PER EMPLOYEE




The effective (or productive) hours per employee is
defined as those hours in which the employee is performing
work. The remaining time is necessary for attending safety
meetings, travel time, administrative time, and employee
leave. Using the productive hours per employee in the USAFISA
study assumes that this figure approximates historical
requirements.
The next step is to determine direct labor
requirements under the new baseline. The number of direct
labor employees needed under the revised organization is
estimated by dividing the estimated direct labor manhours
required to support the revised POM Annex and DLI by the
efficient hours per employee. The calculation is as follows:
48,980hours
____ ___ ___ = 30.8
1,590hours
Rounding to the nearest whole number, 31 direct labor
employees are required to meet the support workload.
The rest of the division can be determined using the
supervisory ratios previously developed. A ratio of 1 level
one supervisor to every 6.71 direct labor employees yields a
requirement of 4.6 level one supervisors. Rounding to the
nearest whole number implies five level one supervisors are
required. Similarly, the ratio of one level two supervisor to
every 1.75 level one supervisors implies 2.8 level two
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supervisors are required. Again, rounding to the nearest
whole number makes the requirement three.
The Operations and Maintenance Division as modified to
correspond to the reduced area of responsibility is summarized
in Table 4.16.
TABLE 4.16
MODIFIED ARMY OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE DIVISION
Fixed 4
Variable (Direct Labor) 31
Variable (Supervisor I) 5
Variable (Supervisor I) 3
Total 43
2. Supply Branch (O&M Division)
The Operation and Maintenance division also contains
a supply branch. This branch provides material procurement
support to the Operations and Maintenance Division. It also
coordinates warehousing and materials handling for facility
maintenance. To modify the Supply Branch, the designated
fixed positions remain constant while the variable positions
are reduced in proportion to the reduced direct labor hours
determined above. A summary of the original USAFISA positions
is shown in Table 4.17.
The work load in the supply branch is considered to be
variable with the exception of the branch chief. The branch
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as broken into its fixed and variable components is
illustrated in Table 4.18.
TABLE 4.17
SUPPLY BRANCH, USAFISA VALIDATED POSITIONS
O&M Supply Branch Employees
Supply Branch Chief 1
Property Control Supervisor 1








SUPPLY BRANCH, FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS





Using direct labor hours as our allocation base for
variable positions, and given the 35 percent reduction
determined previously, the nine variable branch positions are
reduced to 5.85.
0.65 x 9 variable positions = 5.85positions
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Rounding to the nearest whole number yields a requirement for
six people. The total number of supply branch personnel
required under the new baseline organization totals is
summarized in Table 4.19.
TABLE 4.19
MODIFIED ARMY SUPPLY BRANCH (O&M DIVISION)
Revised Supply Branch ( Positions
Fixed 1
Variable 6
ITotal 7 _ _
The same modification technique will be used for the
remaining divisions. Fixed positions will be identified and
held constant. Variable positions are reduced in proportion
to the reduction in their respective driving factor.
3. Family Housing Management
The original USAFISA Housing Management Division is
illustrated in Table 4.20.
TABLE 4.20








The housing director and secretarial positions are considered
fixed. The number of family housing officers depends on the
number of housing units. Thus, the variable positions are a
function of housing units. A summary of fixed and variable
positions for the housing division is shown in Table 4.21.
TABLE 4.21
HOUSING MGT. DIVISION, FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS





4. DER Office of the Director
USAFISA validated positions for the office of the
director are shown in Table 4.22.
TABLE 4.22
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, USAFISA VALIDATED POSITIONS






Both the director and his direct administrative
assistant (secretary) are required regardless of the area of
responsibility. Therefore, both are fixed.
The fixed and variable positions within this division
are summarized in Table 4.23.
TABLE 4.23
DEH OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, FIXED AND VARi £BLE COMWONENTS






USAFISA validated positions for the Administrative
division are shown in Table 4.24.
TABLE 4.24









The administrative officer and the clerk/typist are
designated as fixed positions. An administrative officer is
required regardless of organizational size. Because of the
various paperwork requirements, the clerk/typist is also
considered a fixed component. The two remaining positions
depend on organizational size.
The fixed and variable positions within the
administrative department are sunmmarized in Table 4.25.
TABLE 4.25






6. Engineering and Resource Management Division (ERM)
The Engineering Resource Management Division contains
6 separate branches that perform a variety of functions, from
work management to self help management. The division
includes 29 positions that were validated under the USAFISA
study. The division components are illustrated in Table 4.26.
In determining the fixed and variable positions of this
division, each branch is analyzed separately.
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TABLE 4.26
ERM DIVISION, USAFISA VALIDATED POSITIONS
Engineer Resource Mgt. Division Employees


























Equip/Small Engine Repairman 1
Warehouse/Store worker 1
Storeworker/Screen Shop 1
ITotal J 29 ]
(Source: USAFISA Report)
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a. ERI, Office of the Chief
This office includes the division director and one
secretarial support position. Given the standard requirement
for the director and his administrative support person, both
of these positions are designated as fixed. The fixed and
variable components are summarized in Table 4.27.
TABLE 4.27
ERM OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS





b. MRW, Budget Branch
ERM's Budget Branch includes two budget analysts
and two budget assistants. The budget analyst functions are
split between the Operations and Maintenance appropriation and
the Family Housing appropriation functions. Because the
number of housing units is reduced by a relatively small
amount, the requirement for a separate family housing budget
analyst remains. The other budget analyst is required to
handle the O&M budget functions which exist regardless of the
reduction in the area of responsibility.
The remaining positions vary with the
organization's activity. They are therefore designated as
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variable positions and depend on the size (square feet) of the
facilities supported by the DEH Operations and Maintenance
Division. The fixed and variable components of the Budget
Branch are summarized in Table 4.28.
TABLE 4.28
ERM BUDGET BRANCH, FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS





c. ERK, Work Management Branch
The work management branch includes 11 positions
and is responsible for coordinating and planning work
requirements. Four positions in this branch are designated as
fixed. Project estimators are normally split into a minimum
of three categories; mechanical, structural and electrical.
An independently operating planning and estimating branch
requires specific knowledge and expertise in each discipline.
The three existing estimators in this branch are therefore
categorized as fixed. Additionally, there is a standard
requirement for a branch supervisor. This position is also
classified as fixed.
The remaining positions are designated as variable
because they depend on the amount of work performed by the
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Operations and Maintenance Division. The fixed and variable
positions within the Work Management Branch are summarized in
Table 4.29.
TABLE 4.29
ERM WORK MGT. BRANCH, FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS





d. ERM, Management Engineering Systems Branch
The Management Engineering Branch provides DEH with
computer support and performs studies as required. No
supervisor positions were validated by the USAFISA survey.
Therefore, all these positions depend on the work load. All
positions in this branch are considered variable.
The fixed and variable positions within the
Management Engineering Systems Branch are summarized in Table
4.30.
TABLE 4.30
ERM MGT AND ENGINEERING SYSTEMS BRANCH,
FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS







e. ERM, Energy Management Branch
The USAFISA survey validated two positions within
the energy branch to purchase utilities and liaison with
regulators. One of the two positions is a supervisor. This
supervisor has responsibility over the Management and
Engineering Systems Branch as well. Given that position's
supervisory role and that the installation has utility and
regulatory requirements regardless of size, one position is
categorized as fixed. The additional position is designated
as a variable dependent on installation size.
The fixed and variable positions within the Energy
Branch are summarized in Table 4.31.
TABLE 4.31
ERM ENERGY BRANCH, FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS





f. ERM, Self Help Branch
The self help store is a key component in the Army
management organization for facility maintenance. The Army
performs a significant portion of minor maintenance and repair
work by self help procedures. Therefore, a comprehensive self
help store is required.
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The USAFISA survey validated 6 positions for the
self help store under the original USAFISA baseline. The
store includes one supervisor and 5 additional storeroom
positions. As a supervisor is required regardless of the size
of the self help division, the supervisory position is fixed.
The remaining positions are variable and depend on the square
footage of facility spaces supported with self help materials.
The fixed and variable positions within the Self Help
Branch are summarized in Table 4.32.
TABLE 4.32
ERM SELF HELP BRANCH, FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS






The USAFISA validated position requirements for the
DEH Engineering Branch were not broken down into specific
positions, but rather into general areas. Justification for
the fixed and variable components is based on the Navy's
organizational structure for an Engineering division. The
USAFISA validated positions are illustrated in Table 4.33.
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TABLE 4.33










As per the standard requirement for division
management, supervision, and administration, the division
director and secretary are designated as fixed positions.
This is summarized in Table 4.34.
TABLE 4.34
ENGINEER DIVISION HEAD, FIXED AND VARIABLE POSITIONS
Engineering Division Head Positions
Fixed 2
Variable 0
ITotal 2](Source: TABLE 4.33)
b. Design and Structural Branches
In a Navy organization, the engineering division
includes three main elements: the division director, engineers
and engineering technicians. The rational for fixed positions
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is similar to that of the ERM Work Management Branch. One
engineer qualified in each "standard" engineering discipline
is required in order to function autonomously. Thus, one
Mechanical, one Electrical, one Civil, and one General
Engineer position is fixed.
The remaining positions within this branch are
considered variable. They depend on the workload generated.
The fixed and variable positions within the Design and
Structural Branches of the Engineering Division are summarized
in Table 4.35.
TABLE 4.35
ENGINEERING DESIGN AND STRUCTURAL BRANCHES,
FIXED AND VARIABLE POSITIONS






The Support Branch performs functions similar to
the Navy's Facilities Support Contract Division. These
include contract document preparation and DEH contract
administration. Using the Navy organization as a guide, four
positions perform unique tasks. These positions are
considered fixed. These four fixed positions are the division
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director, a contract specialist, a contract representative,
and a Quality Assurance Inspector. The division director
position might possibly be combined with the contract
specialist position in a small organization. However, it is
included as a separate fixed position in this case because of
the organization's expected size.
The remaining positions are considered variable and
depend on the workload generated. The fixed and variable
positions within the Support Branch of the Engineering
Division are summarized in Table 4.36.
TABLE 4.36
ENGINEERING SUPPORT BRANCH, FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS






The DEH Plans division is broken down into three
branches; the Realty, Master Planning, and Environmental
Branch. The positions as validated under the USAFISA study
are illustrated in Table 4.37. Each branch of this division
is analyzed separately in order to determine which positions
are fixed and which are variable.
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TABLE 4.37
PLANS DIVISION, USAFISA VALIDATED POSITIONS








Env. Project Specialist 4
Total [8 _
(Source: USAFISA Report)
a. Realty and Master Planning Branches
The realty specialist within the Army organization
maintains property records. These tasks are required in any
standard Army organization, but a specialized position is not
necessary. Therefore this position is variable.
Similarly, the Master Planning Branch does not
require a specialized individual who performs only master
planning. This responsibility could be delegated to the
Engineering Division. This position is considered variable.
The fixed and variable components of the combined




REALITY AND MASTER PLANNING BRANCHES,
FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS







The Environmental Branch supervisor and the
secretary positions are fixed in accordance with the standard
supervisory and administrative requirements. The remaining
environmental technician positions are variable and depend on
the size of the supported station's size (total facility
square feet).
The fixed and variable components of the
Environmental Branch are summarized in Table 4.39.
TABLE 4.39







9. Allocation Cost Summary
Table 4.40 summarizes the fixed and variable
components of all divisions and branches within the Department
of Engineering and Housing with the exception of the
Operations and Maintenance area. The table also indicates the
parameter on which the variable positions are based on.
TABLE 4.40
SUMMARY OF ARMY OVERHEAD/INDIRECT LABOR,
FIXED AND VARIABLE COMPONENTS
Fixed Variable Total Variable Factor
Housing Management 2 10 12 Housing Units
Office of Director 2 0 2 N/A
Administrative Branch 2 2 4 Sg. Ft.(non Hsg)
Eng. Resource Mgt
Office of Chief 2 0 2 N/A
Budget Branch 2 2 4 Sq.Ft. (non Hsg)
Work Management 4 7 11 Direct Labor
Branch Hours
Mgt&Engineering 0 4 4 Direct Labor
Systems Branch Hours
Energy Branch 1 1 2 Total Sq.Ft.
Self Help Branch 1 5 6 Total Sg.Ft.
Engineering
Director 2 0 2 N/A
Design/Struct. 4 9 13 Total Sq.FT.
Branch
Support Branch 4 2 6 Total Sq.FT.
Plans Division
Realty/Master 0 2 2 Total Sq.FT.
Environmental 2 4 6 Total Sg. FT.
Total 28 48 76
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The percentage change between the original baseline
and the new 1993 BRAC baseline for each of the allocation
parameters of the variable positions is shown in Table 4.41.
TABLE 4.41
CHANGE IN BASELINE ALLOCATIONS OF VARIABLE POSITIONS
1 1 2Original New Baseline Percent
Housing Units 1400 units 1203 units 86%
Non-Housing SF 3.3 msf 1.9 msf 58%
Total SF 5.9 msf 4.1 msf 69%
DL Hours 74,705 hrs 48,980 hrs 65%
(Source: DRM, Ft Ord and PWD, NPS)
The next step in forecasting the new 1993 BRAC
baseline Army organization is to determine the number of
variable positions required based on the allocation base for
each division or branch. As an example the number of Family
Housing Management Division's variable positions is allocated
by the number of housing units managed. As the number of
units changed from 1400 under the original baseline to 1203
under the new baseline, the number of variable positions is
reduced by the same factor, 1203/1400 (or 86 percent), as
shown below.
0.86 x 10 variable positions = 8.6 positions
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Rounding to the nearest whole number yields a modified
requirement of nine variable positions in the Family Housing
Management Division in order to operate 1203 units. The
remaining variable positions are modified in the same manner
based on their respective allocation factor.
A summary of the entire modified organization for the
reduced 1993 BRAC baseline is provided in Table 4.42. This
summary includes those positions in the Operations and
Maintenance Division which were calculated previously. The
estimated number of positions required in an Army facility
support organization is 112. However, a portion of this
organization's labor will be spent on housing functions. This
falls under the separate Family Housing Appropriation and
therefore must bý. identified.
To do this, positions were identified that only
provide support to housing. These include the Family Housing
Management Division and one budget analyst from within the ERM
Budget Branch, or a total of 12 positions. Next, positions
which only support non-housing or installation facilities were
identified. These positions include the Office of the
Director, Administrative Division, ERM Office of the Chief,
and ERM Budget Branch (less the one budget analyst previously
identified), a total of 9 positions.
87
TABLE 4.42
SUMMARY MODIFIED ARMY FACILITY SUPPORT ORGANIZATION
1993 BRAC BASELINE REQUIREMENTS
FixedJ Variable Total
Operations and 5 45 50
Maintenance
Housing 2 9 11
Office of Director 2 0 2
Administrative Branch 2 1 3
ERM
Office of Chief 2 0 2
Budget Branch 2 1 3
Work Management Branch 4 5 9
Mgt&Engineering Systems 0 3 3
Branch
Energy Branch 1 1 2
Self Help Branch 1 3 4
Engineering
Director 2 0 2
Design/Struct. Branch 4 6 10
Support Branch 4 1 5
Plans Division
Realty/Master 0 1 1
Environmental 2 3 5
[Total 1 33 79 112
The remaining positions are allocated according to the
appropriate allocation parameter, i.e., square footage or
direct labor hours. For example, the 50 positions in the
Operations and Maintenance Division must be allocated between
housing and installation facility functions. The allocation
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factor for this division is direct labor hours. As determined
in a previous section, housing maintenance requires 19,575
manhours of support from the Operations and Maintenance
Division. This division also provides 29,405 hours of direct
labor support to installation facility maintenance. The
division positions are allocated by the resulting direct labor
hour proportions as illustrated below.
19,575 hrs
19,575 hrs + 29,405 hrs
50 positions x 40% = 20 positions
The resulting percentages based on the allocation
parameters for housing and installation maintenance areas are
provided in Table 4.43.
TABLE 4.43
REDUCTION FACTORS
Allocation Factor Housing Base Maintenance
Direct Labor 40V 60%I
Square Feet 46V 54%
(Source: TABLE 4.41)
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Applying these percentages to the various divisions
and branches that provide labor for both housing and
installation facility functions yields labor allocations as
illustrated in Table 4.44.
TABLE 4.44
HOUSING/INSTALLATION LABOR ALLOCATION
Division/Branch Housing Installation Total AllocationFactor
Operations and 20 30 50 DL hours
Maintenance
Housing Mgt. 11 0 11 N/A
Office of Dir. 0 2 2 N/A
Admin. Branch 0 3 3 N/A
ERM
Office of Chief 0 2 2 N/A
Budget Branch 1 2 3 by position
Work Mgt Branch 3.6 5.4 9 DL hours
Eng Sys Branch 1.2 1.8 3 DL hours
Energy Branch .9 1.1 2 Total SgFt
Self Help 1.8 2.2 4 Total SqFt
Branch
Engineering
Director .9 1.1 2 Total SqFt
Design/Struct 4.6 5.4 i10 Total SqFt
Branch
Support Branch 2.3 2.7 5 Total SqFt
Plans
Realty/Master .5 .5 1 Total SqFt
Environmental 2.3 2.7 5 Total SqFt
Total 50.1 61.9 112
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The final step is to determine the labor costs
associated with the Army organization. As discussed in
Chapter III, the average cost per DEH employee will be used to
transform the labor requirements to dollar costs. The Average
salary of $37,000 per DEH employee was provided by the Army
Resource Management Department.1 6  Multiplying this figure
by the labor requirements as determined above yields an
estimate of the total labor costs associated with the Army
facility support organization. Table 4.45 provides the
results.
TABLE 4.45
ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL LABOR COST
Positions Labor Cost
Housing 50.1 $1.854 million
Base Maintenance 61.9 $2.290 million
Total 112 $4.144 million
C. PROPOSED NPS PWD ORGANIZATION
The most recently proposed NPS organization for expanded
facility maintenance and utility operation is presented in
Table 4.46. This organization is sized to provide facility
16 Meeting with Mr. Jack Gaffard, Directorate of Resource
Management, Fort Ord, 18 August 1993.
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maintenance and utility operations to DLI/POM Annex on a
status quo level.
TABLE 4.46
PROPOSED NPS PUBLIC WORKS ORGANIZATION
Division Bzistoi Addition Total
Office of the Dept. Head 2 0 2
Administration Division 3 I 4
Fiscal Division 5 3 8
Facility Support Division 7 6 13
Maint. Control Division 8 7 15
Engineering 10 7 17
Housing Management 8 3 11
Office of Shops Div. Head 2 0 2
Tool Room 4 2 6
Supervisory 12 9 21
Production Control 8 5 13
Emergency Service/Spccifics 28 54 63
S 0andng Job Orders 19 10 29
Technical Services 13 9 22
Housing Maintenance 14 23 56
Total 143 139 282
(Source: NPS Public Works Department)
To ensure the NPS and Army organizations are comparable,
only those functions that are performed by the Army's
organization are included in the NPS organization. Basically,
all of the facility support functions are the same except the
Navy uses Public Works for transportation requirements.
The NPS PWD organization incorporates a Transportation
Branch to maintain vehicles and equipment; the Army relies on
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the Directorate of Logistics (DOL) to fulfill this function.
Only equipment operators are included in the Army's DEH
organization. Accordingly, the Navy organization has been
adjusted to reflect the same overall functional abilities as
the Army's organization.
D. COST ANALYSIS OF NPS PWD PROPOSED ORGANIZATION
To determine estimated labor costs for providing facility
support to DLI and the POM Annex, the NPS Public Works
Department organizational structure must be broken down into
components and allocated to the respective installations. As
discussed in Chapter III, the expanded NPS PWD organization
was developed using a supplemental approach, i.e., determining
the additional manpower/skill positions required. This
supplemental approach enables the Navy to realize any possible
economies of scale that would result from the increased
organizational size.
Furthermore, this supplemental approach "shares" employees
between the Army and Navy installations. This "sharing"
results in a common labor pool which is allocated between the
Army and Navy.
1. Identifying Common Labor Pool
The first step to estimate labor costs for each
respective service is to identify employees constituting the
"shared" labor pool. To do so, the proposed organization is
broken down by division or branch and the component job
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positions are reviewed to determine whether work is performed
at one or both installations.
However, the details on implementing the proposed
organization have not been fully addressed because there is
still uncertainty about whether this consolidation will occur.
Without comprehensive organizational plans, it is impossible
to accurately identify common and direct labor. Therefore,
input from the NPS PWO was obtained to ensure the results were
consistent with his insight.
Tables 4.47-61 provide a breakdown of the proposed
organization by division and branch. Both the existing
organization's positions and the supplementary positions are
indicated. Those job positions which perform work for
multiple installations constitute shared labor and are shaded
in the tables. The sum of the salaries of the "shared"
employees comprise the common costs to be borne by both
services.
TABLE 4.47
Office of Dept Head Existing j Add New
Public Works Off icer 1 0 1
Assistant PWO 1 0 1




Administration Division Existing Add New
Admin. Officer 1 0 1
Asst. Admin. Officer 0 1 1
Admin. Support Aset. 1 0 1
Admin. Asst. 1 0 1
Total 3 1 4
(Source: PWD, NPS)
TABLE 4.49
Fiscal Division Existing Add New
Supyvsr Fiscal Analyst 1 0 1
Lead Acctg. Tech. 0 1 1
Acctg. Tech. 3 2 5
Budget Asst. 1 0 1
Total 5 3 8
(Source: PWD, NPS
TABLE 4.50
Facility Support Existing Add New
Division
Fac. Support Officer 1 0 1
Fac. Support Dir. 1 0 1
Contract Spec. 1 1 2
Contract Rep 1 1 2
QA9 2 3 5
Procurement Clerk 1 1 2




Maint. Control Division Existing Add New
Supvsr. Gen Eng. 1 0 1
Supvsr P&E 1 0 1
Planner & Estimator 4 3 7
Asst. P&E 1 1 2
Computer Specialist 1 1 2
Work Receptionist 0 1 1
Contract Writer 0 1 1
Total 8 7 15
(Source: PWD, NPS
TABLE 4.52
Engineer Division Existing Add New
Supvsr. Gen. Eng. 1 0 1
Clerk/Typist 0 1 1
Engineer 4 2 6
Egg. Tech. 2 2 4
Env. Prot. Spec. 3 2 5
Total 10 7 17
(Source: PWD, NPS)
TABLE 4.53
Housing Management Existing Add New
Division Director 1 0 1
Fa,. Mgt. Branch Head 1 0 1
Hog. Mgt. Specialist 1 0 1
Hsg. Mgt. Asst. 3 1 4
Hsg. Assignment Clrk 1 1 2
Budget Analyst 1 1 2




Office of Shop. Division Existing Add New
Shops Division Dir. 1 0 1
Adain. Asst. 1 0 1
Total 2 0 2
(Source: PWD, NPS
TABLE 4.55
Tool Room Existing Add New
-
Tool Rooa Leader 1 0 1
Tool Mechanic 1 2 3
Tool Room Clerk 2 0 2
Total 4 2 6
(Source: PWD, NPS
TABLE 4.56
Direct Labor Supervision Existing Add J New
Maint. Supvsr 11 2 1 3
Maint. Supvsr I 5 4 9
Work Leaders 5 4 9




Production Control Existing Add New
Production Controller 1 0 1
Supvsr
Production Controller 5 2 7
Mat'l Inspector 0 1 1
MVO/Mat' 1 Expeditor 1 1 2
Purchasing Agent 1 1 2
Total 8 5 13
(Source: PWD, NPS
TABLE 5.58
Emergency Service/ Existing Add New
Specifics
Carpenter 3 6 7
Electrician 4 9 11
Pipefitter 2 3 5
Plumber 0 5 5
Equipment Operator 2 4 6
Locksmith 2 2 4
Maintenance Worker 4 0 4
General Helper 1 0 1
Laborer 5 0 5
Maintenance Mech. 1 22 8
Welder 2 1 3
Tile/Plate Setter 1 0 1
Painter 1 0 1
Roofer 0 2 2




Standing Job Orders _Existing Add New
Power Mech. 1 0 1
Boiler Plant Operator 6 3 9
Water Treatment Operator 0 2 2
Maintenance Mech. 3 3 6
Electrician 1 0 1
Pest Control 1 2 3
Gardener 4 0 4
Laborer 1 0 1
Motor Vehicle Operator 1 0 1
General Helper 1 0 1
Total 19 10 29
(Source: PWD, NPS)
TABLE 4.60
Technical Services Existing Add New
Computer Mech 1 0 1
Elevator Nech 1 0 1
Telephone Mech 2 0 2
Electrician 2 0 2
Electronics Tech 0 1 1
A/C Mech 4 4 8
Audio Visual 2 0 2
Laborer 1 0 1
Powei ipport Equip 0 2 2
Mech.
High Voltage Electrician 0 2 2




Housing Maintenance Existing Add New
Production Controller 1 1 2
Electrician 1 4 5
Carpenter 2 5 7
Maint. Mech 3 9 31
Plumber 2 0 2
Maint Worker 4 4 8
General Helper 1 0 1
Total 14 23 37
(Source: PWD, NPS
Reviewing these tables indicates that the vast
majority of those positions that are "shared" represent
overhead labor (the labor that performs managerial and support
functions). This is consistent with NPS's supplemental
approach to defining the overall manpower requirements. Since
the organization is centralized at NPS, a shared overhead
labor pool is logical. Furthermore, the overhead functions
are typically where centralized organizations achieve
economies of scale.
The complete common labor pool is summarized in Table
4.62. Out of the organization's 282 total personnel, 96








Office of the Dept. Head 2 military
Administration Division 4 $24.8 k
Fiscal Division 8 $24.6 k
Facility Support Division 12 $28.6 k
1 military
Maint. Control Division 15 $41.8 k
Engineering 17 $38.8 k
Housing Management 11 $27.6 k
Office of Shops Div. Head 2 $39.4 k
Tool Room 6 $27.8 k
Production Control 13 $27.1 k
Tech. Services 5 $31.8 k
Total 96(Source: TABLES 4.47-61)
An average salary per division (or branch) is used to
account for each of the individuals' salaries, as discussed in
Chapter III. The average salaries are determined from the
existi~ig NPS PWD organization. An average salary per division
or branch reasonably forecasts the additional employees'
salaries. Table 4.62 also provides the average salary data
as calculated from actual FY 1992 cost data.
No salary is provided for the organization's military
service members. Because NPS is not a DBOF activity, it may
not obtain reimbursement for costs associated with the
salaries of active military service members. These salaries
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are paid from the Military Personnel appropriation and are
incidental to the Operation and Maintenance or Family Housing
appropriations that fund facility support operations.
Therefore, the costs associated with the Office of the Dept.
Head (PWO and APWO) as well as with the Facility Support
Officer (currently a Navy Ensign) are not included.
To develop an accurate and reasonable cost allocation,
an allocation base representative of the actual labor
resources directed to each service is derived below.
a. Allocation Base
To ensure that common cost allocations are
reasonable, each division is individually analyzed to
determine what drives the time employees spend performing
their tasks. The cost driver for each division can be used to
design an allocation scheme that represents actual performance
costs.
Table 4.63 summarizes the appropriate cost drivers
for each division. The Office of the Department Head (the PWO
and the APWO) is not included because their military salaries




Common Labor Allotation Bases
Administration Division No. of Supervisors
Fiscal Division No. of Direct Labor Personnel
Facility Support Division Total SgFt (Base Facilities/Housing)
Maint Control Division No. of Direct Labor Personnel
Engineering No. of Direct Labor Personnel
Housing Management No. of Housing Units
Office of Shops Div. Head No. of Direct Labor Personnel
Tool Room No. of Direct Labor Personnel
Production Control No. of Direct Labor Personnel
Tech Services Square Feet of Base Facilities
The following subsections discuss the rational
behind the selected cost driver for each division:
(I) Administration Division. The Administration
Division provides administrative support to the PWD staff and
management. The vast majority of administrative support
requirements represent overhead personnel. Therefore, it is
logical to allocate the administration division's costs
according to the number of overhead employees. However, all
overhead labor except for the direct labor supervisors are
shared employees. Only the number of direct labor supervisors
assigned to each service is used for the allocation base.
(2) Fiscal Division. The fiscal division provides
accounting and budgetary support to the entire PWD
organization. Facility maintenance and utility operations
generate the purchases, labor expenditures, and other
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financial data tracked by this division. The number of
employees performing direct labor work logically indicates the
facility maintenance and utility operations performed at each
installation. Thus, the number of direct labor employees
provides an appropriate allocation base for this division's
labor costs.
(3) Facility Support Division. The facility
support division formulates and administers facility support
contracts. This work is directly related to the number of
facility support contracts that are implemented by each
station and their content. Because the basic service contract
requirements are similar across installations (refuse
collection, janitorial, grounds maintenance), the contract
content is the driving factor. Thus, total area being
serviced by the contracts is an appropriate allocation base
for their time.
(4) Maintenance Control Division (MCD). MCD is the
centralized office for receiving, generating, and issuing
maintenance orders. Much of its time is spent preparing work
orders carried out by the direct labor personnel. Therefore,
it is appropriate that its time be allocated by the number of
direct labor employees at each installation.
(5) Engineering Division. The Engineering division
prepares designs and resolves problems for work orders. It
also performs specific design/engineering projects. However,
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specific projects can not be forecasted. Thus, they can not
be factored into the allocation base. In general, the
Engineering Division's labor is proportional to facility work
performed. It can be allocated by the number of direct labor
employees at each installation.
(6) Housing Management. Housing management
personnel time is spent administering housing operations.
Thus, it is directly related to the number of houses for which
it is responsible. It's labor cost is allocated on the number
of housing units at each installation.
(7) Office of the Shops Division Head. This
division includes the shops division director and secretary.
The division director manages and supervises the entire shops
division while the secretary provides administrative support.
Their time will likely be spent in proportion to the number of
shop employees assigned to each installation. Thus, the labor
cost is allocated on the number of direct labor employees
assigned to each installation.
(8) Tool Room. The tool roorr stores and issues
tools that shop personnel require for performing maintenance
duties. Therefore, their time is allocated according to the
number of shops employees assigned to each installation.
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(9) Production Control. Production control
provides the material support for performing work orders by
shop personnel. Their time is also allocated by the number of
shops employees.
(10) Technical Services. Many of the technical
services personnel that are designated as common labor work
for both installations. Given that they perform the actual
maintenance work on facilities, they are allocated on the
amount of facilities space (square footage) existing at each
installation.
b. Allocation of Cdoon Costs
The common costs of the proposed organization can
be allocated between the Army and the Navy using the above
data. The number of employees multiplied by their respective
average salary yields the total division labor cost to be
allocated under its respective allocation base. The resulting
allocation proportions are summarized in Table 4.64.
TABLE 4.64
COMMON LABOR ALLOCATION BASES
Number of Supervisors
NPS DLI/POM Total V share V share DLI/P0M
Annex1ZS J Annex
12 9 _21 7__ _ 5 431
Number of Direct Labor Personnel
NPS DLI/POM Total 4 share share DLI /PM
Annex HPS Annex
70 95 165 j 421 S__r
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(Table 4.64 Continued)
Total SgFt (Base Facilities & Housing - million SgFt)
NPS DLI/POM Total % share % share DLI/POM
Annex NPS Annex
2.6 3.8 6.4 41% 59%
Number of Housing Units
NPS DLI/POM Total W share I share DLI/POM
Annex NPS Annex
877 1203 2080 42% 58%
Square Feet of Base Facilities (million SqFt)
NPS DLI/POM Total % share V share DLI/POK
Annex NPS Annex
1.4 1.9 3.3 42% 58%
Applying the allocation bases to the common labor
pool yields the costs allocated to both the Army and the Navy.
The following tables illustrate the allocation method as
carried out for each division.
TABLE 4.65
Administration Division Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number of Supervisors
Salary Cost
4 $24.8 k $99.2 k NPS DLI/POM Annex
1 57% 43%-$56.5 k $42.7 k
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TABLE 4.66
Fiscal Division Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number Direct Labor
Salary Cost Personnel
8 $24.6 k $196.8 k NPS DLI/POM Annex
42% 58%
$82.7 k $114.1 k
TABLE 4.67
Facility Support Division Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Total SqFt
Salary Cost
12 $28.6 k $343.2 k NPS DLI/POM Annex41W 59!k
$140.7 k $202.5 k
TABLE 4.68
Maint. Control Division Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number of Direct Labor
Salary Cost Personnel
15 $41.8 k $627.Ok NPS DLI/POM Annex42% 58V
I$263.3 k $363.7 k
TABLE 4.69
Engineering Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number of Direct Labor
Salarv Cost Personnel
17 $38.8 k i $659.6k NPS DLI/POM Annex
42% 58%
$277.0 k $382.6 k
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TABLE 4.70
Housin Manageawnt Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number of Housing Units
Salary Cost
11 $27.6 k $303.6 k NPS DLI/POM Annex42 W 58%
I • $127,5k $176.1 k
TABLE 4.71
Office of Shops Div. Head Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number of Direct Labor
Salary Cost Personnel
2 $39.4 k $78.8 k NPS DLI/POM Annex42%; sek
$33.1 k $45.7 k
TABLE 4.72
Tool Room Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number of Direct Labor
Salary Cost Personnel
$27.8 kI $166.8 k NPS DLI/POM AnnexS... •42V 58V
TABLE 4.73
Production Control Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number of Direct Labor
Salary Cost Personnel
13 $27.1 k $352.3:k NPS DLI/POM Annex
$148.0 k $204.3 k
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TABLE 4.74
Tech Services Allocation Basis
# Personnel Ave. Total Number of sq ft of Base
Salary Cost Facilities
5 $31.8 k $159.0 k NPS DLI/POM AnnexQ42 % 581
$66.8 k $92.2 k
The following table summarizes the resulting cost
allocation for the NPS facility support organization's common
labor pool.
TABLE 4.75
COMMON LABOR COST ALLOCATION SUMMARY
Common Labor Pool Cost A&llocation
Division NPS DLI/POM Annex Total
Administration $56.5 k $42.7 k $99.2 k
Fiscal $82.7 k $114.1 k $196.8k
Facility Support $140.7 k $202.5 k $343.2k
Maint. Control $263.3 k $363.7 k $627.Ok
Engineering $277.0 k $382.6 k $659.6k
Housing Management $127.5 k $176.1 k $303.6k
Office of the Shops $33.1 k $45.7 k $78.8k
Div. Head
Tool Room $70.1 k $96.7 k $166.8k
Production Control $148.0 k $204.3 k $352.3k
Tech. Services $66.8 k $92.2 k $159.0k
Total $1265.7k $1720.6k $2986.3k
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2. Identifying Navy/Army's Direct Costs
To complete the labor cost estimate attributable to
for the Army and the Navy under the NPS proposed organization,
all the direct costs associated with each respective
installation must be compiled. Recall that direct costs are
those that are fully attributable to one specific
installation.
Although, as discussed above, the Navy's proposed
organization was formulated on a supplemental approach that
results in many common costs, there are also some direct
costs. Because of the geographic separation of the
installations, the organization is designed so that a number
of employees will work for only one specific installation.
This will facilitate providing the customer service and
facility familiarity requirements. Also installation specific
tasking may require specialized positions unique to only one
installation.
Those positions which are not shaded in Tables 4.47-61
are employees who will be performing work at a particular
installation. The salaries associated with these individuals
comprise the direct costs for their respective installation.
The list of direct cost employees is summarized in Table 4.76.
Multiplying the average salary for each division or
branch by the number of employees assigned to each
installation provides the installation's direct cost for that
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division or branch. Table 4.77 shows the direct NPS and




Branch NPS DLI/POM Total Average
Annex Salary
Emerg Serv./Specifics 28 54 82 $29.7 k
Standing Job Orders 19 10 29 $29.2 k
Tech. Services 9 8 17 $31.8 k
Housing Maint 14 23 37 $29.5 k
Supervisory 12 9 21 $40.3 k
[Total Employees 82 104 186 j
TABLE 4.77




Emerg. Serv./Specifics $831.6 k $1603.8 k
Standing Job Orders $554.8 k $292.0 k
Technical Services $286.2 k $254.4 k
Housing Maintenance $413.0 k $678.5 k
Supervisory L $483.6 k $362.7 k
Total $2569.2 k $3191.4 k
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3. Total Cost Per Installation
The total labor cost for both the Army and Navy is
computed by adding the direct and allocated common costs as
determined above. The results are provided in Table 4.78.
TABLE 4.78
ARMY/NAVY TOTAL LABOR COST SUMMARY
I NPS (Navy) DLI/POK Annex (Army)
Allocated Conmnon $1265.7 k $1720.6 k
Costs
Direct Costs $2569.2 k 3191.4 k
Total I $814.5 k I $4912.0 k
a. Family Housing/Installation Facilities Funding
Because Congress appropriates separate funds for
family housing and base operations, labor costs must be funded
with the right appropriation. Family housing management,
maintenance and operations, and any overhead labor
attributable to family housing, is to be paid with family
housing appropriations. All other base facility operation and
maintenance functions are funded by the O&M appropriation.
Total labor costs must be allocated between housing
and base operations. Housing maintenance and housing
management labor are obviously direct costs of family housing.
However, other divisions support housing. Thus, they require
reimbursement from the family housing appropriation.
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Engineering, Facility Support, Maintenance Control,
Office of the Shops Division Head, Supervision, and the Tool
Room all support housing. In keeping with the allocation
rational previously discussed, the allocation bases
illustrated in Table 4.78 are used for family housing
overhead.
All of the above listed divisions or branches
provide overhead support to housing on a routine basis.
Because this support is routine, the costs can be allocated in
a representative manner. On the other hand, housing
occasionally receives support from other direct labor branches
(such as the Emergency/Specifics Branch) on a non-routine
basis. Because of the irregular and infrequent nature of this
support, non-housing direct labor is not allocated.
TABLE 4.78
COMMON LABOR ALLOCATION BASES
Division Allocation Base
Engineering No. Direct Labor Personnel
Facility Support Contracts Total SqFt (Hsg & Non-Hsg)
Maint. Control No. Direct Labor Personnel
Office of the Shops Div Head No. Direct Labor Personnel
Supervision No. Supervisors
Tool Room No. Direct Labor Personnel
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When applied to the NPS data, the three allocation
bases found in the above table result in the percentages
presented in Table 4.79.
TABLE 4.79
NPS HOUSING/INSTALLATION ALLOCATION PERCENTAGES
NPS Housing/Non-Housing Allocation Bases
No. of Direct Labor Personnel
Housing Non-Housing Total % Hsg V Non-Hsg
14 56 70 20% 80%
Total SoFt (million SgFt)
Housing Non-Housing Total % Hsg V Non--Hsg
1.2 1.4 g 2.6 1 46% 54%
No. of Supervisors
Housing Non-Housing Total ! Hso V Non-Hsg
2 10 12 17% 83%
Applying the allocation proportions to each of the
divisions or branches contributing to both housing and non-
housing functions, and segregating the direct housing
operations and maintenance labor costs yields the results
presented in Table 4.80.
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TABLE 4.80
NPS HOUSING/INSTALLATION LABOR COSTS
NPS Family Housing/Installation Facilities Allocation
Division Housing Non- Total Allocation
Housing Base
Administration 0 $56.5 k $56.5 k N/A
Fiscal 0 $82.7 k $82.7 k N/A
Facility Support $64.7 k $76.0 k $140.7 k Total SqFt
Maint. Control $52.7 k $210.6 k $263.3 k No. DL
Personnel
Engineering $55.4 k $221.6 k $277.0 k No. DL
Personnel
Housing Management $127.5, k 0 $127.5 k N/A
Office of the Shops $6.6 k $26.5 k $33.1 k No. DL
Div. Head Personnel
Tool Room $14.0 k $56.1 k $70.1 k No. DL
Personnel
Production Control 0 $148.0 k $148.0 k N/A
Emerg. 0 $831.6 k $831.6 k N/A
Serv./Specifics
Standing Job Orders 0 $554.8 k $554.8 k N/A
Tech. Services 0 $353.0 k $66.8 k N/A
Supervisory $82.2 k $401.4 k $483.6 k # Supvsrs.
Housing Maintenance $413.0 k 0 $413.0 k N/A
Total $816.1 k $3018.8 k J $3834.9 k
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Repeating the process for the Army yields the
allocation proportions summarized in Table 4.81.
TABLE 4.81
ARMY HOUSING/INSTALLATION ALLOCATION PERCENTAGES
DLI/PO( Annex Housing/Non-Houaing Allocation Bases
No. of Direct Labor Personnel
Housing Non-Housing Total V Hsg % Non-Hsg
42 53 1 95 44% 56%
No. of Supervisors
Housing Non-Housing Total % Hsg V Non-Hsg
3 6 9 33% 67%
Total SqFt (million SqFt)
Housing Non-Housing Total V Hsg V Non-Hsg
1.9 1.9 3.B j 50% 50%
Applying the allocation proportions to each of the
divisions or branches contributing to both housing and non-
housing functions and segregating the direct operations and
maintenance labor costs of housing yields the results for the
Army as presented in Table 4.82.
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TABLE 4.82
ARMY HOUSING/INSTALLATION LABOR COSTS
DLI/POM Annex Family Housing/Installation Facilities Allocation
Division Housing Non- Total Allocation
Housing Base
Administration 0 $42.7 k $42.7 k N/A
Fiscal 0 $114.1 k $114.1 k N/A
Facility Support $101.25 k $101.25 k $202.5 k Total SgFt
Maint. Control $160.0 k $203.7 $363.7 k No. DL
Personnel
Engineering $168.3 k $214.3 k $382.6 k No. DL
Personnel
Housing Management $176.1 k 0 $176.1 k N/A
Office of the Shops $20.1 k $25.6 k $45.7 k No. DL
Div. Head Personnel
Tool Room $42.5 k $54.2 k $96.7 k No. DL
Personnel
Production Control 0 $204.3 k $204.3 k N/A
Emerg. 0 $1603.8 k $1603.8 k N/A
Serv./Specifics
Standing Job Orders 0 $292.0 k $292.0 k N/A
Tech. Services 0 $346.6 k $346.6 k N/A
Supervisory $119.7 k $243.0 k $362.7 k # Supvsrs.
Housing Maintenance $678.5 k 0 $678.5 k N/A
Total J$1466.45k $3445.5k
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b. Housing/Installation Facilities Summary
The resulting labor cost estimates for both the
Army and the Navy under the NPS facility support proposal as
segregated by housing and installation facility functions is
summarized in Table 4.83.
TABLE 4.83
ARMY NAVY TOTAL LABOR COSTS, HOUSING/INSTALLATION
Housing Installation Total
Facilities
Navy $816.1 k $3,018.8 k $3,834.9 k
Army $1,466.45 k $3,445.55 k $4,412.0 k
119
V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. CCOPARISON OF HISTORICAL COSTS
To begin analyzing the data presented in Chapter IV, we
first consider the historical cost data for fiscal year 1992.
Table 5.1 presents the unit (or average) cost data as
calculated in this study. The data reflects the total cost of
facility support (less construction contracting and
transportation) as provided by the respective Army and Navy
facility support organizations. As indicated in the table,
there is a significant disparity in facility support costs
between the two organizations.
TABLE 5.1
FY 1992 HISTORICAL FACILITY SUPPORT COSTS
Annual Facility Support Cost (FY 92 $)
Installation facilities Housing"'
Navy - NPS $6.35 per sqft $4,180 per unit
Army - overall $2.43 per sqft $3,114 per unit
(Source: Tables 4.4 and 4.10)
17 This cost data is inclusive of all facility support costs
incurred by housing as the relevant costs of concern could not be
fully segregated from Army cost data. Fire protection, police
protection, material, and utility costs are included in addition to
labor and contract costs.
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According to the data, the Navy was providing facility
support services at a unit cost approximately 2.6 times
greater than the Army for installation facilities and about
1.3 times greater than the Army for family housing. However,
the Army organization was vastly larger than the Navy's. The
Army supported 11.3 million square feet of installation
facilities and 5,943 family housing units compared to the
Navy's 1.4 million square feet of facilities and 877 units.
Given the substantial size differences between the two
organizations, the disparity in unit costs is not
unreasonable. In fact, it is consistent with returns to scale
in a large, centralized facility support organization.
FORSCOM funded a large facility support organization
centralized at Fort Ord vice several smaller decentralized and
autonomous organizations located at each specific
installation.18 This created economies of scale that reduced
the Army's unit costs relative to the Navy. In contrast, the
Navy does not realize these returns to scale as they use their
own separate and autonomous facility support organization.
The overhead requirements for supporting such a small
installation result in relatively high unit costs.
18 Although there are some facility support personnel
stationed at each installation, they are by no means self-
sufficient and rely on the central Fort Ord organization for
support. Their existence is necessitated by the geographical
separation of the various installations.
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This is not to imply that the entire difference in unit
costs is based upon returns to scale. The cost disparity also
reflects differences in operating procedures and strategies as
discussed in Chapter III. The Navy puts a higher priority on
preventive maintenance, so its "up-front" operating costs are
higher than the Army's (hopefully, in return for savings later
on).
Further research into the unit cost dispar ty between the
Army and the Navy is required to obtain more detailed insight
into the underlying explanations. Although it is likely that
various factors are behind this unit cost difference, this
study is primarily concerned with the impact of returns to
scale on a large centralized organization. Though the
specific impact can't be quantified, it appears that the
economies attained by a large centralized organization play a
role in the unit cost disparity between the Fort Ord and the
NPS facility support organizations.
B. COMPARISON OF PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONS
In addition to the historical cost data, Chapter IV also
provided Army and Navy data to support DLI and the POM Annex
after closing Fort Ord. The organizational data provided by
NPS PWD was current and based upon the BRAC 1993 recommended
size and content of the POM Annex. However, current Army
organizational data was not available and thus required
estimation.
122
Validated organizational requirements for the much larger
BRAC 1991 recommendations were used as a baseline. The method
used for revising the Army 1991 baseline acknowledges that
there are fixed and variable positions within the
organization. This distinction is incorporated into the
estimating process. Although the estimated revision may have
minor errors in specific positions, it provides a reasonable
estimate of the resulting organizational requirements.
The following subsections will analyze the composition and
cost for the proposed Navy and forecasted Army organizations.
By first looking at the general composition of the two
organizations, efficiencies inherent to each organization can
be identified. Comparing the estimated costs associated with
each organization will indicate whether organizational
efficiencies actually translate into a cost benefit.
1. Organizational Efficiencies
This study hypothesizes that a single, centralized
organization can support the remaining Monterey Peninsula
military installations more efficiently than two smaller,
decentralized organizations. The assumption behind this
statement is that a larger, centralized organization can
capture operational economies of scale. Analyzing and
comparing the proposed enlarged Navy Public Works organization
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to the Army facility support organization (sized to operate
autonomously) helps indicate whether this assumption is valid.
a. Returns to Scale
To realize economies of scale, an organization must
be able to double its output at less than twice the cost. 1 9
In other words, an organization must produce twice the amount
of output with less than twice the total of resource inputs.
Savings can be attained by increases in the direct labor
efficiency. They also can be driven by economizing on
overhead when separate and autonomous organizations are
consolidated into a single organization.
The proposed Navy organization can be broken up
into its overhead and direct labor components as illustrated
in Table 5.2 below.
TABLE 5.2
EXPANDED NPS PUBLIC WORKS, DIRECT/OVERHEAD COMPONENTS
Navy's Proposed Existing Additional
Organization




19 Robert s. Pindyck, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics,
Second Edition, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1989, pg 217.
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The overhead portion of the organization consists of the
employees who perform the necessary supervisory and support
functions. The direct labor portion consists of those
individuals who perform actual facility maintenance or utility
operation tasks.
If economies of scale can be achieved by facility
support organizations, one would expect to see it reflected in
the organizational makeup of the proposed NPS public works
organization. To perform this type of analysis, the output
must be defined. In the case of facility maintenance and
utility operations, the output is service to buildings and
installations. One common way to unitize this output is to
use the area (square feet) of building/facility space being
serviced.
In this case, the facility support responsibility
is increased by over 146 percent. 2 0  The amount of labor
input is increased by less than 100 percent. Thus, it
appears that the proposed organization does in fact capture
economies of scale.
The vast majority of savings apparently comes from
savings in overhead labor requirements. As indicated in Table
5.2 above, the present NPS PWD organization has 69 overhead
employees. As the area of responsibility more than doubles,
20 NPS's 2.6 msf (housing and non-housing) currently serviced
by PWD, is increased by 3.8 msf (housing and non-housing) in the
DLI/POM Annex.
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only 43 additional overhead employees are added. This equates
to a 146 percent increase in output with only a 62 percent
increase in overhead.
b. Direct/Overhead Labor Ratio
The resulting impact of organizational size on
overhead labor requirements is further illustrated in the
direct and overhead labor percentages shown in the tables
below. Both organizations provide facility support internally
with their direct labor force.21 Since both organizations
perform in essentially the same manner, the relative
efficiency of each organization can be illustrated by their
resulting direct labor ratio. Table 5.3 presents the ratios
as derived from each organizational proposal.
The data in the table indicates a significant
disparity in the direct labor ratios between the two
organizations. While direct labor comprises sixty percent of
the expanded Navy organization, the Army organization
implements a direct labor percentage of less than thirty
percent. This finding illustrates the enormous overhead
requirement of autonomous facility support organizations.
21 Both organizations will use service contracts to augment
the direct labor force to a degree. Only in housing unit




Army No. of Personnel Percent
Direct Labor 31 28%
Overhead Labor 81 72%
FTotal 112 100%
Navy No. of Personnel Percent
Direct Labor 170 60%
Overhead Labor 112 40%
Total 282 100%
(Source: Tables 4.16, 4.40, 4.46)
The Army's low direct labor percentage can be
partially attributed to their greater reliance on contract
labor in support of housing. Nevertheless, compensating for
this fact will not significantly decrease the disparity. 2 2
The Army's direct labor percentage remains quite low when
compared to that of the single large Navy organization.
Using a separate and autonomous Army organization
requires a relatively large overhead structure to support its
operations. The data indicates that for every direct labor
employee, there are approximately three indirect or overhead
employees. Consolidating all facility support under a large
Navy organization improves the direct labor/overhead ratio to
1 to 0.67. There are proportionately more individuals
22 Even doubling the number of full time direct labor
employees in the Army organization results in only a 43 percent
direct labor ratio.
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providing actual facility support services than there are
performing indirect and overhead functions.
Of course, our estimate of the Army's direct labor
force could be too low or the overhead pool too high. To
confirm our results, the direct to overhead labor ratio is
compared with the ratio of the original validated Army
organization (used as a baseline for our estimate). The
validated organization is comprised of more than two overhead
employees for each direct labor employee. 2 3
The current NPS organization, which operates
autonomously, has a direct to overhead labor ratio of about
one to one. This is also notably higher than the ratio under
the expanded NPS organization. Comparing the resulting ratios
for each of the cases illustrates that operating a small and
independent facility support organization demands a relatively
large overhead burden.
2. Estimated Labor Costs
Regardless of whether there are apparent efficiencies
associated with a large centralized organization vice smaller
decentralized organizations, the overall cost remains the
bottom line. There are numerous other factors inherent to the
23 This ratio of 2:1 is not inconsistent with the ratio of 3:1
obtained from our estimate of the reduced Army organization. The
ratio would not remain constant as the organization is reduced.
Despite the reduction in direct labor requirements (and thus direct
labor personnel), numerous overhead positions remain fixed
regardless of number of direct labor personnel. This forces the
ratio to change.
128
two organizations that may overshadow any scale economies.
Therefore, the differential costs associated with each
organization will be estimated to determine if these
efficiencies actually translate into cost savings. In
analyzing labor costs, it is assumed that both organizations
have sufficient resources and ability to satisfactorily meet
the facility support requirements. The following tables
provide the labor and housing service contract costs for DLI
and the POM Annex for each organization. The housing service
contract costs are discussed below.
TABLE 5.4
NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL COSTS
Estimated Annual Labor Costs For DLI/PCK ANNEX (FY 92 $)
Navy Organization Installation Facilities Housing
Labor Cost $3.446 million $1.466 million
Housing Contract N/A $0.359 million[Tota1. $3.446 million $1. 825 million .
Estimated Annual Labor Costs For NPS (FY 92 $)
Navy Organization Installation Facilities Housing
Labor Cost $3.019 million $0.816 million
Housing Contracts N/A $0.262 million





Estimated Annual Labor Costs For DLI/PO( ANNEX (FY 92 $)
Army Organization Installation Facilities Housing
Labor Cost $2.290 million $1.854 million
Housing Contract N/A $1.524 million
Total $2.290 million $3.378 million
(Source: Table 4.45)
Only the differential costs are relevant to this
analysis. They make one organization less or more expensive
than the other. We assume that material costs are the same
for both organizations. Contract costs are also considered
equal with the exception of housing service contracts.
Because the Army organization is set up to use service
contracts for routine housing maintenance to a much greater
extent than the Navy organization, the housing contract costs
are differential costs that cannot be overlooked. Conversely,
both organizations apparently plan to use the same amount of
service contracts for installation facility support (for
example, janitorial, refuse collection, and grounds
maintenance). Thus, these contracts will result in
approximately the same cost to either organization. They are
therefore not a differential cost, and are not estimated here.
FY 1992 historical cost data was used to estimate the
housing service contract costs. The Army's total housing
contract costs were prorated over its housing units. The same
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approach was used for the Navy. This assumes that both
organizations will continue to perform roughly the same amount
work under contract. In FY 92, the Army spent $7.531 million
on housing service contracts and maintained 5,943 housing
units. This results in an average contract cost of $1,267 per
unit. This cost is distributed over the 1,203 units now
planned. The Navy spent $262,000 on housing contracts and
maintained 877 housing units. This results in an average cost
of $299 per unit to be distributed over the 1,203 units
planned.
In comparing the resulting costs of both
organizations, we see that the Navy's overall cost of facility
support (both housing and installation combined) appears to be
slightly less than the Army's. The Army's total differential
costs for supporting DLI and the POM Annex is $5.668 million.
The Navy's cost is $5.271. This represents a difference of
about $0.4 million or approximately 7 percent. Thus, the
organizational efficiencies do apparently translate into a
small cost benefit when costs are viewed in their entirety.
The Navy's cost advantage comes from its housing
support costs. Its total estimated cost for housing support
is almost $1.6 million less than the Army's estimate.
Conversely, the Navy's estimated labor cost for DLI/POM Annex
installation support is over $1.1 million higher than the
Army's, a result that contradicts the economies of scale
argument.
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Further review of our analysis identified several
factors contributing to these results. First, the Army labor
cost allocations which we made between housing and
installation facilities may not accurately reflect the true
costs. Further research into the Army's organization is
required to clarify and validate the division of labor between
housing and installation facilities. A different allocation
base, such as overhead hours, may better allocate overhead
costs. However, lack of Army overhead manhour data prevented
checking this calculation here.
Second, there is a significant disparity in the number
of direct labor employees between Army and Navy organizations.
The Army organization is composed of only 31 direct labor
employees to maintain the DLI/POM Annex while the Navy
utilizes about 90 direct labor employees. It is questionable
whether 31 direct labor employees can maintain 1.9 million
square feet of installation facilities and 1203 housing
units.24
The Army may be able to temporarily provide support
with this number of direct labor positions. However, the
labor requirement will increase over time with increases in
the maintenance backlog. The question arises, How long will
they be able to maintain the installation before the backlog
24 NPS currently uses 74 direct labor employee8 to maintain
1.4 million square feet of installation facilities and 877 housing
units.
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becomes extremely large and costs grow out of control? This
question raises a significant issue: a short term cost
advantage may turn into a substantial future cost detriment.
On the other hand, Navy organizational requirements
could also be overstated. In fact, it appears that there is
probably some overstatement. For example, the number of
maintenance personnel (twenty) designated for barracks
maintenance at DLI appears several times larger than what is
actually needed. Nevertheless, judging the correct labor
requirement is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The question regarding the amount of manpower required
to provide adequate facility support is a significant issue.
It is associated with the variability in service levels and
differences in standard operating procedures between the two
organizations. However, it also brings forth the possibility
of hidden agendas and incentives behind the proposed
organizations. These must be filtered out in order to truly
determine which option is most cost effective. To resolve the
manpower issue, further research into the actual support
requirements is necessary. The backlog maintenance and
specific statements of work must be reviewed to objectively
validate the manpower requirements.
Analyzing the proper manpower requirements for
supporting both DLI and the POM Annex is beyond the scope of
this thesis. Unfortunately, it is an issue that may affect
data and conclusions. The uncertainty brought on by the
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difficulty in allocating the Army's labor between housing and
installation support is removed by restricting further
analysis to the total cost of overall support (both housing
and installation). The combined costs indicate each
organizations' overall cost effectiveness and the allocation
between housing costs and installation facility costs is of
little relevance.
Thus, the only issue remaining is whether the amount
of labor is overstated or understated by the individual
proposals. As previously stated, this question is beyond the
scope of this research and it can only note the significant
differences in direct labor estimates.
Table 5.6 provides the average total differential cost
per square foot for both the Army and the Navy organizations.
The number of housing units was converted to square feet of
housing based on total square footage data obtained from both
services. NPS' housing contains 1.4 million square feet while
DLI/POM Annex's housing contains 1.9 million square feet. 2 5
This data simply restates the results from previous
tables. The overall cost effectiveness (for both housing and
installation support) is improved under a shared centralized
facility support organization. The data indicates that both
NPS and DLI will realize savings by consolidating their
25 The square feet of the housing to remain at the DLI/POM
Annex was estimated by reducing the total square feet of housing
(9.3 msf for Fort Ord, FHL, DLI) in proportion to the reduction in
number of housing units (5,943 to 1,203 units).
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facility support needs under an expanded NPS public works
organization.
TABLE 5.6
COST PER OVERALL SQUARE FEET
MLXI/P(( Amaex
Navy Expanded PWD Army
$1.39 / sqft $1.49 / sqft
lips
Navy Expanded PWD Original PWD2 6
$1.58 / sqft $1.76 / sqft
(Source: Table 5.4 and 5.5)
The cost advantage for the expanded NPS PWD is
attributed to the lower overhead burden inherent to the large
centralized organization. The Navy needs only to supplement
its overhead component. The Army must retain a full
compliment of overhead positions. The Navy is able to
effectively lower its per unit overhead burden by expanding
output (additional facility support performance) because there
is less than a proportional increase in total overhead labor.
Figure 5.1 presents a hypothetical average cost curve
for a facility support organization. The curve illustrates
the situation in which savings accrue by using one large
organization vice separate smaller organizations. If DLI
relied on its own Army organization, and NPS continued status
26 Calculated from NPS Comptroller accounting data (FY 92).
135
quo, both organizations would be operating with relatively
high unit costs. Using two separate and autonomous facility
support organizations increases unit costs because of the
large overhead structure required by each organization.
However, if DLI consolidates its support requirements with NPS
and relies on an expanded NPS organization, the unit cost is
effectively reduced. A single overhead structure is created
in which the costs are shared between the two organizations.
The centralized overhead structure contains fewer employees
than in two individual and autonomous organizations, providing
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C. IMPACTS TO NPS UNDER EXPANDED PWD
As is illustrated in the previous section, expanding the
NPS PWD to support the DLI/POM Annex reduces NPS's costs.
Presumably, NPS would chose not to support DLI unless 4t could
capture some of the economies of scale in its own internal
costs. It is not NPS's responsibility to subsidize the
DLI/POM Annex. Because "win/win" results are important for
both the Army and the Navy to accept consolidation, the
impacts to NPS are analyzed further.
The NPS comptroller's FY 1992 accounting records reveal
that the labor cost for installation support was $3.271
million, the labor cost of facility support for housing was
$1.046 million, and housing contract costs were $0.262
million. Dividing the installation labor cost by the area of
installation facilities yields a cost of $2.34 per square
foot. Combining the housing labor and contract costs and
dividing by the number of housing units yields a unit cos. of
$1,462 per unit.
These unit costs can be compared with the costs estimated
for the expanded NPS public works organization. As presented
above, the labor cost for installation support was estimated
at $3.019 million and the total labor/contract cost for
housing support was estimated at $1.078 million. This
translates to $1.99 per square foot for installation support
and $1,373 per housing unit for housing support.
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Figure 5.2 illustrates the efficiency and savings that
could be attained. Again, sharing the numerous overhead
positions between DLI and NPS reduces the actual cost that NPS
must bear if run independently.
Avenge Annul Avenge Annual
Cost Instalhation Facilities CoHousing
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D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOIOEDATIONS
1. Conclusions
It is evident that returns to scale can be realized
under a centralized facility support organization. Returns to
scale were noted in comparing the cost of the large Fort Ord
facility support organization (servicing Fort Ord, DLI, and
Fort Hunter Liggett) with the small, autonomous NPS facility
support organization (servicing only itself).
Expanding the NPS PWD organization increases returns
to scale and can effectively reduce the cost of supporting the
DLI/POM Annex (as well as NPS itself). The returns reflect
significant savings in the facility support organization's
overhead structure.
However, the cost savings determined in this study are
relatively small. As illustrated above, the overall savings
is only $0.4 million. This small cost advantage could easily
be reversed through possible estimation errors in the study's
forecasts and/or assumptions.
However, the actual manpower structures of the two
organizations support the economies of scale argument.
Despite the small differences in total costs, a much larger
direct work force is obtained under the expanded NPS public
works organization. Because of the savings in the overhead
structure, an expanded public works organization can provide
a much larger (about 3 times) direct labor force while still
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remaining less costly than a separate Army facility support
organization (or at least extremely competitive if there are
off-setting errors).
Therefore, expanding the NPS public works organization
to provide consolidated facility support to the military
installations of Monterey is more cost effective than using
separate and individual organizations. In stating this, one
further assumpt-on is noted. Start up costs were not
addressed in this study. Expanding the NPS public works
organization will undoubtably require various start up costs.
The organization's plant, property, and equipment must be
sized so as to support more employees and the DLI/POM Annex.
This thesis assumes that any initial start up costs are
minimal and have a quick payback from the cost savings.
From discussions with the NPS Public Works Officer, it
appears that the existing plant, property, and equipment is
essentially adequate and no major capital expenditures are
required to support a large increase in the labor force.
Additional tools, equipment, and vehicles are required, but
much of this can probably be acquired from closing Navy bases
in the San Francisco Bay area or assumed from the Fort Ord
Department of Engineering and Housing.
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a. Limiting Factors
The conclusions stated here are supported by the
data available. However, there are some limiting factors that
may affect the study's results.
While gathering data, Fort Ord would not provide
DEH maintenance records, accounting records, manhour records,
and statements of work. Concern for job preservation in the
base closure environment made this information politically
sensitive. Because of this limitation, manpower requirements
were estimated based on the 1991 USAFISA survey results.
While these estimates are generally accurate, decisions on the
ultimate outcome of the DLI and the POM Annex could be better
made using actual data.
Additionally, several factors influenced the
ability to collect impartial data. While the data received is
not false, factors are present which could encourage skewing
the data to benefit one organization or another. The Navy had
no incentive to propose an organization that minimized
requirements. In fact, the internal NPS organization could
only benefit by adding positions which were previously
precluded under the current fiscal constraints. Even if the
Navy's resulting estimate was higher than the Army's, NPS
would still continue under their present configuration and
organizational strength. In other words, the NPS public works
organization could only gain from this approach.
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On the other hand, employees within Fort Ord's
Department of Engineering and Housing could help preserve
their employment by reducing the Army's overall cost. This
factor encourages understating the requirements to lower
perceived future costs.
It is necessary to judge the composition of the
organizations and to validate them against the actual support
requirements. However, this is beyond the scope of this
thesis. Thus, it is considered a limiting factor. An
impartial outside organization with expertise in manpower
analysis and full access to facility support records may be
best suited to validate the organizational structure.
Our analysis was based entirely on cost. Although
cost is an important aspect, one must always consider the
impact and costs of displaced personnel. Also, "corporate
knowledge" of key individuals may be lost in consolidating
support with NPS. As the costs of the two alternatives become
closer, decision makers should pay more attention to these
impacts.
2. Recommendations
Based on these conclusions and in light of the
limitations, a centralized Navy organization to consolidate
facility support for the military on the Monterey Peninsula is
recommended. Using an expanded NPS PWD appears to offer a
"win/win" situation for both DLI and NPS. The relative
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increase in efficiency translates into cost savings for both
installations. However as stated above, there are some
limitations and assumptions that play an important role in
this conclusion. Further research into these areas may
improve the creditability of the recommendation.
a. Subjects For Further Research
Areas requiring further research are as follows:
"* Allocation methods for overhead costs within facility
support organizations. Specifically, in a centralized
facility maintenance organization at NPS, which cost
drivers and methods best allocate PWD overhead costs to
housing and installation maintenance.;
"* Detailed analysis of direct and indirect labor
requirements for the DLI and the POM Annex after closing
Fort Ord. An objective review of the facility support
requirements is necessary to validate proposed
organizational manpower structures.;
"* The cost effectiveness of preventative maintenance in
facility support operations. A comparison of the labor
and material costs of Fort Ord's DEH versus that of NPS'
PWD is necessary to substantiate the advantage of a large
direct labor force.;
"* A cost/benefit analysis on the use of direct labor versus
commercial activities (contracts) for housing maintenance.
It is possible that the Army's extensive use of contract
labor for housing maintenance is more cost effective than
using "in-house" labor. This may lead to greater
efficiency in the NPS public works organization.;
"* An analysis of transitional issues and a proposed
implementation plan. Differences between Army and Navy
facility support organizations and their standard
operating procedures can prevent a smooth transition as
well as hamper future operations. Both organizations must
be prepared for such organizational change.;
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* An analysis and proposal for a cost accounting and cost
allocation scheme for a centralized facility support
organization. If DLI was to consolidate its facility
support requirements with NPS, an equitable billing system
is required. It is questionable whether NPS's current
accounting procedures are adequate to fulfill this need.;
and
* Other areas of base operations support may also be more
economically performed by consolidation with NPS. There
are possibly returns to scale associated with other
functions such has supply operations. It is possible that
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